# Towards Privacy-Friendly Online Advertising

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May 2009, W2SP




#### Internet Economy

Online advertising is at center of Internet economy

- Immediate and personalized
- Enables Behavioral targeting

Annual \$ Revenue — 1997 through 2008



Source: Interactive Advertising Bureau Internet Advertising revenue report, 2008


#### Benefits

- For users
  - Relevance of ads
  - Sponsored services
- For websites
  - Generate profit from ads
  - New business models

#### **Privacy Concerns**

- Track user activities online
  - Interests (visited websites, search terms)
  - Conversations (email)
  - Friends (social networks)
- Privacy footprint (Krishnamurthy and Wills)
  - 72% of web servers share at least one advertiser
  - 3 third-party domains contacted on average per accessed web site

## Privacy/traceability Trade-off



Provide a way to control amount of information shared

#### Outline

- 1. Online Advertising
  - Privacy Implications
  - Existing Solutions
- 2. Proposed Solution
  - Privacy friendly Cookie management
  - User centric
- 3. Preliminary Evaluation
  - Firefox Extension

## Online Advertising

Users Visible servers Hidden servers  $\mathbf{U}$   $\mathbf{S}$   $\mathbf{D}$ 

**Associated** 

web sites

u -> s<sub>1</sub>: www.nytimes.com

 $s_1 \rightarrow u$ : index.html

 $u \rightarrow d_1$ : ads.com, **TP-cookie** 

 $d_1$ -> u: ads

u -> s<sub>2</sub>: www.google.com

 $s_1$ -> u: index.html

 $u \rightarrow d_1$ : ads.com, **TP-cookie** 

 $d_1$ -> u: ads

### Traceability

- TP-Cookies enable
  - Spatial tracking: Track over different domains
  - Temporal tracking: Identify subsequent visits
- Referrer reveals visited website

- Example of data collected by advertisers:
  - 10h00: www.nytimes.com, cookie
  - 10h02: www.nytimes.com, cookie
  - 11h00: www.facebook.com/friends, cookie

## **Existing Solutions**

#### All or nothing

- Block requests to advertisers
- Block TP-cookies
- Allow all

#### Same origin policy

- "Only the server that sets a cookie can access it"
- Prevents loss of data confidentiality or integrity
- But too permissive with respect to online tracking

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#### **Proposed Solution**

- Trade-off privacy and traceability
  - Limit spatial and temporal tracking
  - User-centric solution

- Define policies for use of cookies
  - User privacy preferences
  - User advertisement preferences
  - Visited web site

## Key Idea

- Maintain a collection of cookies in parallel
  - Sent cookie depends on the visited web site and advertiser

Domain	Cookie
ads.com	<b>c1</b>




Domain	Website	Cookie
ads.com	nytimes.com	<b>c1</b>
ads.com	google.com	<b>c2</b>

### Key Technique

- To obtain a new cookie
  - Do not send existing cookies in HTML header
  - Server assigns a new cookie
- Privacy-Friendly cookie management
  - Alternate among cookies in collection

## Limit use of TP-cookies per domain Use for a limited number of times



u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.nytimes.com, c1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.nytimes.com/technology, c1

u-> **d**<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.google.com, **c2** 


because nytimes != google

## Limit use of TP-cookies per web site category and within categories Use for a limited number of times

- Categories define type of web site
  - nytimes.com => news
  - Readily available (e.g., Alexa)



- Spatial tracking threshold L<sub>s</sub>
  - Limits spatial tracking across web sites within categories



 $L_s = 2$ 

Category

News

News

News

Search

**Email** 

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.swissinfo.ch, c1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.nytimes.com, c1

u-> **d**<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.ft.com, **c**2

 $u > d_1$ : ads.com, www.google.com, c3

 $u \rightarrow d_1$ : ads.com, mail.google.com, c4

Because  $3 > L_S$ 

Because search != news

Because email != search and


email != news

## Limit use of TP-cookies based on URLs and user preferences Use for a limited number of times


- URLs
  - Leak information through referrer
  - google.com/search?q=julien
- Preferences on web site categories
  - Privacy: What users do not want to share
  - Advertising: What users want to get

## Setting up Preferences

#### Google Ad preference manager



#### Rely on online social communities



$$\sum_{b_i \in H(B)} w_1(b_i) \cdot w_2(b_i) < L_s$$

URLs (w <sub>1</sub> )	User Privacy Pref. (w <sub>2</sub> )
0.1	0
0.9	0
0.1	1
1	1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.google.com, c1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.google.com/search?q=computers, c1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.facebook.com, c1

u-> d<sub>1</sub>: ads.com, www.facebook.com/search?q=nevena, c2

$$L_s = 1$$

Because  $0.1 + 1 > L_s$ 

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
#### Implementation

- Firefox extension: PrivaCookie
  - Proof of concept code
  - Get it on <a href="http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger">http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger</a>
- TP cookie detection
  - Compare originating URL with current URL
- Local cookie table
  - Link cookies with hidden server that caused its assignment and visible server hosting ads
  - ( Cookie, visible server, hidden server )


## Study

- Chose 10 pages from each of the top 20 domains
- Firefox extension pagestats
  - Runs browser in batch mode with list of web sites
  - A total of 200 pages

# Number of hidden servers for each of the top 20 domains



## Number of visible servers for each hidden server



## Top 10 associated visible servers connected with the most popular advertisers

Hidden	Visible Servers									
Server	Yahoo	Ebay	AOL	IMDB	Orkut	Msn	Myspace	HI5	Blogspot	Rapidshare
doubleclick	$c_1 c_{1,1}$		$c_1 c_{1,2}$	$c_1 c_{1,3}$	$c_1 c_{1,4}$	$c_1 c_{1,5}$	$c_{1} c_{1,6}$	$c_1 c_{1,7}$	<b>c</b> <sub>1</sub>   <b>c</b> <sub>1,8</sub>	
quantaserve			$\sqrt{}$			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	
atmdt	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$		$\checkmark$				
advertising			$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$						
yieldmanager	$\checkmark$		$\sqrt{}$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$

Extension caused 81 additional cookies assignments

#### **Tracking Countermeasures**

- Track based on IP
  - Anonymizer/Tor
- Track with
  - Cache cookies
  - Browser history
  - Plugins (e.g., Flash cookies)
  - Proposed policies also apply to those cases
- Cooperative tracking?

#### Conclusion

- We propose a solution for trading-off privacy & traceability
  - Protects user privacy
  - Allows for targeted online advertising
  - No changes required from advertisers
  - Puts users in control
- Key idea: Maintains a collection of cookies in parallel
- Future Work:
  - Implement approach 2 & 3
  - Implement Javascript support
  - Consider other parameters in approach 3

### **URL** Weight

- Parse URL for n-grams
  - "search"
  - "id"
  - "username"
- Can be done automatically before visiting URL