(How) Do People Change Their Passwords After a Breach?

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Abstract—
To protect against misuse of passwords compromised in a breach, consumers should promptly change affected passwords and any similar passwords on other accounts. Ideally, affected companies should strongly encourage this behavior and have mechanisms in place to mitigate harm. In order to make recommendations to companies about how to help their users perform these and other security-enhancing actions after breaches, we must first have some understanding of the current effectiveness of companies’ post-breach practices. To study the effectiveness of password-related breach notifications and practices enforced after a breach, we examine—based on real-world password data from 249 participants—whether and how constructively participants changed their passwords after a breach announcement.

Of the 249 participants, 63 had accounts on breached domains; only 33% of the 63 changed their passwords and only 13% (of 63) did so within three months of the announcement. New passwords were on average 1.3× stronger than old passwords (when comparing $\log_{10}$-transformed strength), though most were weaker or of equal strength. Concerningly, new passwords were overall more similar to participants’ other passwords, and participants rarely changed passwords on other sites even when these were the same or similar to their password on the breached domain. Our results highlight the need for more rigorous password-changing requirements following a breach and more effective breach notifications that deliver comprehensive advice.

Index Terms—passwords, data breaches, security behavior

I. INTRODUCTION

Password breaches have been on the rise, affecting mainstream companies such as Yahoo! and gaming sites such as League of Legends and Neopets among others [11]. Stolen passwords have been largely exposed in insecure forms such as in plain text or by weak hashes (often unsalted or easily guessed through dictionary attacks) such as MD5 and SHA-1 hashes, leaving users vulnerable unless they change their passwords on the affected sites [11]. Additionally, when a company suffers a breach involving passwords, rarely are the users affected solely on the compromised domain [17]. Previous work has shown that, on average, a user exactly or partially reuses their passwords on over 50% of their accounts [17], [20], [35]. In such cases, when a person’s password on one domain is compromised, they incur the risk that an attacker will be able to gain access to their other accounts that use similar or the same passwords. In order to make informed recommendations to companies on best risk mitigation practices after a breach, it is instructive to examine people’s current password-changing behavior after breaches.

Prior work has explored problems related to data breaches and changing passwords, e.g., how people comprehend data breaches [27], [48], what factors make them more inclined to take action after breaches [27], [48], and how people change passwords in response to reuse notifications [23]. Researchers found that people were more likely to heed advice about actions after security breaches based on who was giving the advice and often underestimated the harm that could be incurred as a result of a compromise [27], [48]. Related to password changes, researchers found that very few of their participants in an online study reported intentions to change passwords after being notified that their passwords were compromised or reused, including because they believed in the “invincibility” of their passwords [25]. These studies are important to understand how to better inform people about the impact of data breaches and to understand people’s mental models when it comes to taking action to protect themselves. However, we still lack an understanding of the actual extent—empirically measured—to which actions taken by companies to inform their users after a breach are effective.

We make a significant effort towards developing this understanding. We analyze longitudinal, real-world password data over two years to understand whether people change their passwords after a breach and the quality of these password changes. Specifically, we examine: (1) whether people with an account on a breached domain changed their passwords after the breach and how constructive these changes were; (2) the extent to which people changed similar passwords on domains other than the breached domains; and (3) how password changes related to breaches compare to all other password changes.

Our dataset was collected from the home computers of 249 participants between Jan. 2017 and Dec. 2018 and includes all passwords used to log onto online services. Of the 249 participants, 63 had accounts on one of the breached domains we studied and were active in the study at the time of the breach announcement and for three months after. We found that only 21 of the 63 participants changed their password after a breach announcement and only 15 did so within three months of the announcement. The majority of these changes were in response to a high-risk breach (i.e., the Yahoo! breach). We also found that only a minority of password changes were to stronger passwords and that new and old passwords shared a substring on average almost half the length of the longer of
Participants who changed passwords on the breached domains had on average 30 accounts with similar passwords. Of the 21 participants who changed passwords, 14 changed at least one similar password within a month of changing their password on the breached domain. These 14 changed, on average, only four similar passwords within that month.

As a baseline for the quality of password changes, we looked at all password changes made by the 249 participants over the two-year period. A large fraction (69.6%) of the password changes resulted in weaker or equal-strength passwords, and old and new passwords on average shared a substring 85.1% the length of the longer of the pair. Overall, the properties of password changes on breached domains were roughly similar to the properties of the baseline password changes, though on average resulted in more dissimilar passwords.

Our results suggest that current breach notification systems do not sufficiently inform users about breach notification. Our results clearly indicate that more should be done—through breach notifications or other means—to induce users to change passwords both on the affected domain and especially on other domains, which users generally ignore. Similarly, additional means are needed to educate and encourage users to make their new passwords both strong and different from their existing passwords.

II. RELATED WORK
A. Data breaches and security incidents

Prior work has studied how people hear about breaches [18], what people comprehend about data breaches [27], [48], and what makes them take action [27], [48]. Overall, they found that people are more willing to take action after a breach depending on their perceptions of tangible security benefits [27] and the source of advice about actions [48]. A study about breaches and consumers found that customers' spending at a retailer fell significantly after the retailer suffered a breach [26], while another found that only a minority of respondents would stop doing business with a company after a breach [13]. Other work has found that people react to security incidents involving accounts on a major social network in a variety of ways, from doing nothing to actively seeking out information [37].

Users can be alerted about breaches that affect them not just by the organizations that suffer breaches, but also by dedicated services like HaveIBeenPwned [17], LifeLock [2], and Enzoic [7]. Additionally, password managers such as LastPass [10] and the password manager built into Firefox [8] alert users if their logins are found in data breaches. Researchers recently created a privacy-preserving protocol by which clients can query breach repositories without revealing the actual credentials being queried [40].

B. Password-related behaviors

Several large-scale password studies have shown that password reuse is rampant [17], [20], [35], [44], finding that on average people reused over half their passwords [17], [35]. Other work showed that people have trouble managing their passwords and using password managers [36], which contributes to password reuse [39]. Recent work surveyed people's reactions to notifications that their password was compromised or was being reused on other sites and found that, when advised or required to change their passwords, less than a third of respondents reported any intention to comply [23]. Another study about defenses against credential stuffing (when an attacker uses lists of breached usernames and passwords to gain access on a large scale to several other websites) found that when participants were notified about credential breaches through a privacy-preserving breach querying protocol, 26% of the notifications caused participants to create passwords that were at least as strong as their previous ones [40].

Researchers have measured password-related behaviors in a variety of ways, e.g., by asking participants to install password-logging tools [20], [44] and analyzing breached passwords from publicly posted lists [12], [17] or privately collected datasets [32]. We leverage data collected through the Security Behavior Observatory (SBO) (see Section III), which captures detailed, real-world behavior of home computer users by instrumenting their operating systems and web browsers [21], [22], [35].

III. DATA COLLECTION AND DATASET
A. Data collection

We obtained data collected as part of the Security Behavior Observatory (SBO) project. The SBO is a data-collection infrastructure for a longitudinal study of the security behaviors of Windows computer users [21], [22], [35] that started data collection in October 2014 and ended in July 2019. The collected data includes information about system configuration, system events, operating system updates, installed software, and browser-related data such as browsing history, settings, and the presence of browser extensions. To collect this information, participants’ home computers were instrumented with software that collects data via system-level processes and browser extensions. Specifically, the browser extensions were installed only in participants’ Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox browsers, and recorded every entry into an HTML input field at the time of browser events such as clicks, key presses, form submissions, and page loads. The SBO data collection and analysis (including this project) was approved by its institution’s ethics review board.

The data analyzed in our study was collected from January 2017 to December 2018 and includes 249 participants who participated in the SBO study for at least 90 days during that period. Each participant was enrolled in the SBO study at different points in time and for different durations. The dataset we examine includes information about every entry made into a password field in a web page, as determined by the browser extension, including: a salted one-way hash of the password; the URL of the form in which the password was submitted; the strength of the password (represented as the approximate number of guesses a sophisticated attacker would need to
We study how participants changed their passwords in response to nine data breaches that became public in 2017 and 2018. We select these breaches based on two broad criteria:

1. At least one participant in our dataset entered a password on the breached domain before the breach announcement date and remained active in the study for 90 days afterward.
2. The breach announcement date overlapped with the time interval for which we had SBO password data.

We then selected only those breaches that met the following criteria:

1. The breach announcement date overlapped with the time interval for which we had SBO password data.
2. At least one participant in our dataset entered a password on the breached domain before the breach announcement date and remained active in the study for 90 days afterward.

This yielded the following nine breached domains, for which we studied participants’ password-change behavior: Imgur (breach announced Nov. 2017) [31], Deloitte (Sep. 2017) [28], Disqus (Oct. 2017) [46], and Yahoo! (Feb. and Oct. 2017) [29], [30], MyFitnessPal (Mar. 2018) [6], Chegg (Sep. 2018) [4], CashCrate (Jun. 2017) [3], FLVS (Mar. 2018) [5], and Ancestry (Dec. 2017) [2].

For each of these breaches, we first identified participants who entered passwords on one of these domains, implying that they had an account on the domain and therefore were potentially affected. We identified these participants as those who entered a password on at least one of the breached domains before the breach announcement date and were active in the study for at least 90 days after the announcement. We then checked whether identified participants changed their password on the affected domain. If they did, we checked whether the new password was stronger than the old one, how similar the new and old passwords were, whether they also changed similar passwords on other sites, and whether the password change caused less reuse between the password on their breached account and other passwords. We next describe the process of identifying password changes.

A. Identifying password changes

For each participant who had an account on at least one breached domain, we extracted the last password that they entered on the domain before the breach announcement date. We then looked for the first new password (i.e., different from the last one entered before the breach announcement) successfully entered on the breached domain after the breach announcement. If no new password was found, we concluded that the participant had not changed their password.

We also identified whether participants who changed their passwords on the breached domains changed any similar passwords on other domains. We consider two passwords similar if they share a substring that is at least as long as half the length of the longer password. For example, the passwords “iluvDONUTS90” and “ih8DONUTS90” are similar since they share the substring “DONUTS90” that is at

B. Filtering passwords

The SBO browser extension collected every entry made into an HTML password field. This captured both the entry of correct passwords as well as attempted logins that failed because an incorrect password was entered. The recorded passwords may occasionally have been entered by other users on the participant’s computer. A single participant could also have multiple accounts and passwords on the same domain.

We needed to eliminate any failed login attempts from this dataset and any passwords that did not belong to the participant’s main account. We combined collected password entries across multiple browsers on each participant’s machine and extracted the “correct” passwords for a participant by applying heuristics inspired by Pearman et al. [35] and Wash et al. [43], as follows.

We first compiled all password entries on each domain in chronological order. For each domain, starting from the participant’s first password entry on that domain in our dataset, we divided the entries into clusters where the differences between timestamps within one cluster was less than 15 minutes. We considered the last entry in this ordinal cluster to be the “correct” password of a cluster, i.e., signaling that the user probably logged in correctly and will not attempt to log into that domain again for a while. We then further filtered these clusters to remove occasional non-participant logins and each participant’s secondary accounts, if they had multiple accounts. If the “correct” password of a cluster reappeared in a later cluster, we assumed that the passwords entered between the two occurrences could have been due to intermittent logins either not by the main user or for less-used accounts. We only did not consider the entries to be due to intermittent logins when any of the passwords entered between the two occurrences occurred more frequently than the re-appearing password for the participant or if the password was submitted over more days in the case of frequency ties. We do not consider the re-occurrence of an older password to mean the participant changed their password back to an old password since domains typically do not allow users to change their password to a previously used password.

This process left us with a set of “correct” password entries, which is the final dataset we use for password-related analyses.

IV. METHODOLOGY

We study how participants changed their passwords in response to nine data breaches that became public in 2017 and 2018. We select these breaches based on two broad criteria:

We started with a list of breaches comprised of:

- Identity Force’s list of biggest breaches in 2017 [16] and Digital Information World’s list of biggest breaches in 2018 [38]; and
- breached domains listed on haveibeenpwned.com (HIBP) for which breached data included passwords [11]. HIBP is a website that keeps track of sites that have been compromised and a service that people can query to find out whether their personal data has been compromised in a breach.

We further filter this raw data as described below.

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We also identified whether participants who changed their passwords on the breached domains changed any similar passwords on other domains. We consider two passwords similar if they share a substring that is at least as long as half the length of the longer password. For example, the passwords “iluvDONUTS90” and “ih8DONUTS90” are similar since they share the substring “DONUTS90” that is at
least half as long as the longer password, “iluvDONUTS90”. We measure similarity by examining passwords similar to the last passwords entered on any domain before the breach announcement. If a participant changed their password on a breached domain, we examine whether they changed any of their similar passwords in the month that followed.

Even though our dataset directly captures passwords only when they are entered on participants’ home computers, we are able to capture password changes made from other devices too, because we observe the new (or unchanged, if they haven’t been changed) passwords on the next login from participants’ home computers. Many sites cache authentication credentials and do not require users to type in their password on every login. However, we study people’s behavior over a long enough period that authentication credentials, if properly implemented, would have timed out and participants would have had to eventually use their passwords to log in.

B. Measuring the effect of password changes

When participants changed their passwords on a breached domain, we computed how much stronger (or weaker) the new passwords were (as described in Section III), the similarity between their old and new passwords, and whether the new password was more unique compared to passwords used on other accounts.

We computed the similarity between old and new passwords using a normalized similarity metric: the length of the longest common substring (of length ≥ 3) between two passwords divided by the length of the longer password. If two passwords do not share a substring longer than two characters, we consider them completely dissimilar [35].

To examine the relative uniqueness of the old and new passwords, we computed the difference in the amount of (exact or partial) reuse among a participant’s passwords before and after they changed their password on the breached domain (described in Section V). We calculated the extent of reuse of the old password at the time of the latest entry of the old password, and the extent of reuse of the new password a month after the password change, i.e., a month after the first entry of the new password on the breached domain. We calculated this reuse after a month to allow time for the similar passwords on other domains to be changed. If a participant changed passwords on more than one breached domain, we computed the average.

Computing password reuse: To quantify password reuse, we build on the concepts of exact and partial reuse as defined in previous work on password reuse [35]. A password for a particular account is exactly reused if the same participant uses the same password on another account. A password is partially reused if it shares at least a three-character substring with another of that participant’s passwords [35]. An exactly-or-partially reused password is one that satisfies either of these definitions.

Given a password on a domain, we computed its reuse score as the fraction of that participant’s other passwords that exactly or partially reuse the password in question. We measured reuse based on the latest password entered by the participant on each distinct domain before a given point in time.

C. Computing baseline password-change statistics

To provide a baseline against which to compare breach-related password changes, we computed password-change statistics for all password changes by all 249 participants over the two years spanned by the dataset. For every instance of a new password per participant—ignoring the first occurrence of a password since those may have been created prior to the start of data collection—we captured the ratio of the strength of the new password to the old. We also computed the length of substrings (of at least three characters) shared by new and old passwords. Finally, to have a baseline for how strong participants’ passwords are overall, we computed the average strength of all of each participant’s unique passwords entered per domain during the time period spanned by the dataset, i.e., if a participant had three unique passwords on google.com and five on yahoo.com, we computed the average strength of those eight passwords even if some of the yahoo.com passwords were exactly reused on google.com.

V. Results

A. Participants

Of the 249 participants, 60% identified as female, 39% as male, and the rest did not provide their gender. Ages ranged from 20–81 years with a mean of 34.1. A majority (57%) were students, and 28% had professions that involved programming. Of the 249 participants, 63 had passwords on one or more of the nine domains involved in a password breach. Table I shows the number of participants who had an account on each breached domain.

B. Changed passwords

Only 21 of the 63 affected participants changed a password on a breached domain after the breach announcement. In total, 23 passwords were changed on these domains. Of the 21 participants, 18 were Yahoo! users; the remaining 31 Yahoo! users (out of 49) did not change their passwords although all were affected by the breach according to the breach announcement [30]. Two participants changed their Yahoo! passwords twice, once after each breach announcement. Two participants changed their password on the breached domain.
within one month of the breach announcement, a total of five within two months, and eight within three months.

C. Quality of new passwords

For each changed password, we measured the similarity between the old and the new password, the strength of the old and the new passwords, and the extent of password reuse before and after the password change (see Section IV). If a participant changed more than one password, we report the average results over all the participant’s password changes.

Of the 21 participants who changed their passwords, nine created stronger (see Section III) passwords and 12 created weaker passwords or ones of equal strength. On average, participants created new passwords that were $1.3 \times$ stronger than their old passwords after transforming strength on the $\log_{10}$ scale (henceforth, all such comparisons are on $\log_{10}$-transformed strengths). Seven of the 21 participants who changed their password created a new password that shared at least a three-character substring with their old password; for all participants who changed a password, new and old passwords shared a substring that was on average 41% as long as the longer of the two passwords.

The 21 participants who changed a password on a breached domain had, on average, 30 passwords similar to their older breached password (where similar passwords are those that share a substring of at least half the length of the longer password). Fourteen of these participants changed, on average, only four of these similar passwords on other sites within the month after changing their password on the breached site. These fourteen participants changed their similar passwords to be on average $1.10 \times$ stronger than their original password on the breached domain and $1.18 \times$ stronger than the password being changed. However, the majority (63%) of the changes resulted in weaker or equal-strength passwords. Nine participants changed to a password that shared a substring of three or more characters with their old password; these nine participants’ new passwords on average shared a substring 44% the length of the longer password with their older counterparts.

Overall, participants changed very few passwords on breached domains and even fewer similar passwords on other domains. Even when they did change a password, the change was often not constructive.

D. Password reuse

The passwords changed by our participants were roughly evenly divided between being less reused and more or equally reused. We examined the change in password reuse for each participant who changed a password on a breached domain, comparing the reuse before the password change and a month after it. For nine participants the new password on the breached domain was more reused, for ten it was less reused, and for two it was equally reused.

In other words, while participants’ new passwords were slightly stronger and often substantially different from their old passwords on the same domain, the new passwords on breached sites were still often similar to passwords on other domains.

E. Comparison to baseline password changes

Looking at all password changes by our 249 participants over the two year period, we observed 223 participants making a total of 3041 password changes, including the changes on the breached domains. 70% of these password changes resulted in weaker or equally strong passwords. However, new passwords were on average $1.23 \times$ stronger than older passwords (again $\log_{10}$-transformed) and the median change in password strength was neutral (i.e., the old and new passwords were equally strong). All 223 participants who changed passwords made at least one password change that involved carrying over a substring of at least three characters; in such cases, old and new passwords shared a substring, on average, 85% the length of the longer of the two.

Figure 1 shows, per participant, how changes in password strength for passwords on breached domains compare to changes in strength of other changed passwords. The green line on the graph shows the average increase in strength after a password change for each of the 223 participants over all their password changes. The red dots show password changes on a breached domain. Most participants’ changes on breached domains resulted in slightly weaker passwords (red dots above or below the green line) and a minority resulted in substantially stronger passwords (red dots above the green line), compared to the average changes in password strength. Figure 2 shows the average strength of all of each participant’s unique passwords entered per domain, computed as described in Section IV-C.

Overall, password changes showed relatively similar changes in strength, regardless of whether they were on breached domains; however, breach-related password changes resulted in more dissimilar new passwords.
VI. LIMITATIONS

Although our work provides valuable insights into the effectiveness of post-breach regulations through actions people take after password breaches, it is subject to a few limitations, including those due to the nature of the data collection.

The participants whose behavior we study are not representative of the larger population; for example, a quarter had jobs that involve programming and many were students. Hence, we make no claims with respect to generalizability. We also did not have data about the relative importance of each breach to the data subjects. However, for the 49 participants with Yahoo! accounts, we observed (by examining their web browsing history) that almost a fourth visited a Yahoo! mail page multiple times a day and another fourth visited such a page at least once every four days. This suggests that a large fraction of these participants were using their Yahoo! passwords to protect email accounts, and hence they should be concerned about the breach.

We do not have data about whether participants were explicitly notified about a breach; rather, we study changes within a window of time after a public breach announcement.

Our analysis of passwords was limited in its precision because passwords were represented by the hashes of three-character and longer substrings instead of in plaintext. This type of information about passwords has been used previously to study password reuse [35] and is sufficient to reveal substantial reuse in our application.

The data we analyzed was collected from Windows computer users and limited to passwords entered on Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox. Users of non-Windows operating systems may exhibit behaviors different than the participants in our dataset. Our participants whose password data we analyzed used Internet Explorer (IE) on average for only 2.86% of all their browsing and largely to visit websites that would likely not require them to log in. Given that IE usage was low among the participants in our dataset and that Windows is the dominant OS for personal computers [1], we do not believe that the unavailability of data about people using non-Windows machines and of password data from other browsers is likely to fundamentally affect our findings.

Finally, although their data has been used for several security- or privacy-related studies [15, 22, 24, 55], the participants enrolled in the SBO study may be biased towards less privacy- and security-aware people, given the nature of the SBO data collection infrastructure.

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Out of 63 participants with an account on a breached account, only 21 changed a password on the breached domain, and only eight did so within three months. Participants on average had 30 passwords similar to their password on the breached domain, but on average changed only four of these within a month after changing their password on the breached domain. Even when they changed their password on a breached domain, most participants changed them to weaker or equally strong passwords. And, regardless of whether participants changed their similar passwords within a month of the first change, their new passwords on the breached domains were on average more similar to their remaining passwords.

Some facets of good password maintenance behavior may be difficult for an average user to grasp [14, 24, 25, 42, 44]. For instance, the affinity towards changing to weaker or equal-strength passwords could be because when people feel compelled to choose new passwords they have poor awareness of password strength or the additional memory burden leads them to pick weaker passwords [19, 42]; e.g., they might change just enough characters to satisfy system requirements. Related to partial password reuse, people may find it difficult to understand how their “different” password is still similar to other passwords, i.e., they might be unintentionally partially reusing passwords. Potential mitigating efforts could be to integrate password-reuse trackers within tools that people may already use and trust to store their passwords. Some password managers, such as 1Password, already warn users if one of their saved passwords is reused. Password managers, including those built into web browsers, could go further and more actively discourage password reuse.

Overall, our findings suggest that password breach notifications are failing dramatically, both at causing users to take action and at causing users to take constructive action. Regulators should take note of the ineffectiveness or absence of breach notifications and impose requirements on companies to implement better practices [23, 41, 45, 47, 49]. In particular, they should encourage companies to send repeat notifications until they have positive confirmation that the notifications have been understood and that any instructions have been followed. Regulators should also require that companies force password resets after a breach and provide actionable instructions on how to create “strong” passwords, describe the risks of password reuse, and strongly suggest to users that they change passwords beyond the affected domain. From a preventative standpoint, regulators could incentivize companies to use an authentication method other than passwords or to require their users to use two-factor authentication. Companies
should also be required to hash and salt their passwords to avoid credential-stuffing and rainbow-table attacks on plaintext or weakly hashed passwords\[34, 40\]. Regulators could also require services to subscribe to HIBP and to force users to change their passwords when they encounter a matching hash.

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