

### At Your Fingertips: Considering Finger Distinctness in Continuous Touch-Based Authentication for Mobile Devices


Zaire Ali and Jamie Payton Department of Computer Science University of North Carolina at Charlotte Vincent Sritapan Cyber Security Division US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate

### **Our Personal Assistant**

[13]



% of smartphone owners who have used their phone to do the following in the last year





6.1B

Smartphone subscriptions by 2020


### **Active Authentication**



### **Active Authentication**

Single-Factor Authentication (Only Using One Group)

- Knowledge
  - Passwords
  - PINs
  - Patterns
- Possession
  - Token
  - Key Card
- Inherence
  - Retina
  - Fingerprints



Example of Common Weak Swipe Patterns


### **Passive Authentication**

			Distinct Data				
Gesture on Device		Time (ms)	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate	Pressure	Size	
Jh	Time (ms)	500176	172.9635	626	0.282353	0.282353	
	X-Coordinate	504485	258.4167	559.0695	0.298039	0.298039	
	Y-Coordinate Pressure	507079	319.4074	467.0485	0.286275	0.286275	
	Size	508157	554.0085	611	0.27451	0.27451	
	Collectable Features	509971	175.8468	576.6588	0.258824	0.258824	


29

Q


### **Passive Authentication**



### k-Nearest Neighbor




### **Support Vector Machines**




### State of the Art: SVM

Study by Xu et al.

- Used SVM with Radial Basis Function (rbf)
- Accuracy Declined With More Users
- Assumed Users Always
  Used the Same Style








Ó






Ó




Does authentication accuracy improve by training with several of a user's fingers?




### **App Development**


Please perform all of these activities using ONLY your right thumb! ОК



### **App Development**



### **Pilot Study Setup**



- Online advertisement and snowball sampling
- 6 participants (3 male, 3 female)
- Droid Maxx Devices
- 5 Days



### **Pilot Study Setup**



### Distinct Data

Time (ms)	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate	Pressure	Size
500176	172.9635	626	0.282353	0.282353
504485	258.4167	559.0695	0.298039	0.298039
507079	319.4074	467.0485	0.286275	0.286275
508157	554.0085	611	0.27451	0.27451
509971	175.8468	576.6588	0.258824	0.258824




MotionEvent Gesture on Device			SensorEvent		Dat	a Stored in Vector	
	Time (ms)	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate	Pressure	Size	X-Accelerometer	Y-Accelerometer
	548476	422	522	0.282353	0.282353	1.474828	5.152322
$\widehat{\mathcal{N}}$	548514	427.4653	568.3857	0.298039	0.298039	1.474828	5.152322
dur	548525	429	618.5961	0.298039	0.298039	1.474828	5.152322
	548541	426.0154	676.2451	0.290196	0.290196	1.474828	5.152322
$\sim$	548557	417.4294	745.6889	0.278431	0.278431	1.474828	5.152322

69


6

### Preprocessing




## **Our Approach**

- SVM with Radial Basis Function (rbf)
- 10-fold Cross-Validation to Compute Accuracy








# $Accuracy = \frac{Correctly \ Classified \ Points}{Number \ of \ Testing \ Points}$




### Without Accelerometer









### **Are Fingers Distinct?**



### **Are Fingers Distinct?**




### Should Training Data Include Only One Finger?




### Should Training Data Include Only One Finger?


Without Accelerometer



### Should Training Data Include Several Fingers?



### **Should Training Data Include Several Fingers?**



### **Lessons Learned**

- Active Authentication is Annoying
- Fingers are Distinct
- Training Data Should Include Several Fingers



- Address potential limitations related to the number of participants in our pilot study through a more expansive study
  - more users
  - wider range of gestures
  - longer period of time
- Analyze effects of training data set sizes
- Latency of real-time classification on mobile devices



This project is the result of funding provided by the Science and Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland Security under contract number D15PC00160. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency.

### **Broad Agency Announcement**

### DHS S&T Cyber Security Division BAA Mobile App Security Industry Day

June 9, 2016 | 9AM - 12PM | Hyatt Regency Crystal City

S&T's Cyber Security Division announces a new mobile app security solicitation! Join us to learn about this new solicitation. Amendment 21 (HSHQDC-16-R-B0006 A000001) (<u>https://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS/OCPO/DHS-</u> OCPO/HSHQDC-14-R-B0005/packages.html)

http://www.cvent.com/d/wfqtz4 for details and to register. This event is complimentary, however, space is limited. Please note: Registration closes June 7.

GU

-5)

omeland

Science and Technislogy

### **Questions?**

6



### References

- [1] J. Bonneau, "The science of guessing: Analyzing an anonymized corpus of 70 million passwords," in Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on, May 2012, pp. 538–552.
- [2] Y.-L. Chen, W.-C. Ku, Y.-C. Yeh, and D.-M. Liao, "A simple textbased shoulder surfing resistant graphical password scheme," in Next-Generation Electronics (ISNE), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on, Feb 2013, pp. 161–164.
- [3] N. Micallef, M. Just, L. Baillie, M. Halvey, and H. G. Kayacik, "Why aren't users using protection? investigating the usability of smartphone locking," in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services, ser. MobileHCI '15. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 284–294.
- [4] S. Gold, "Wireless cracking: there's an app for that," Network Security, vol. 2012, no. 5, pp. 10–14, 2012.
- [5] M. Frank, R. Biedert, E. Ma, I. Martinovic, and D. Song, "Touchalytics: On the applicability of touchscreen input as a behavioral biometric for continuous authentication," CoRR, vol. abs/1207.6231, 2012.
- [6] H. Xu, Y. Zhou, and M. R. Lyu, "Towards continuous and passive authentication via touch biometrics: An experimental study on smartphones," in Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2014). Menlo Park, CA: USENIX Association, 2014, pp. 187–198.

### **References (Cont'd)**

[7] L. Li, X. Zhao, and G. Xue, "Unobservable re-authentication for smartphones." in NDSS. The Internet Society, 2013.
 [8] T. Feng, J. Yang, Z. Yan, E. M. Tapia, and W. Shi, "Tips: Context-aware implicit user identification using touch screen in uncontrolled environments," in Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, ser. HotMobile '14. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 9:1–9:6.

- [9] N. Sae-Bae, K. Ahmed, K. Isbister, and N. Memon, "Biometric-rich gestures: A novel approach to authentication on multitouch devices," in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ser. CHI '12. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 977–986.
- [10] J. Clark, Designing for touch. New York, N.Y: A Book Apart, 2015.
- [11] S. Hoober, "How do users really hold mobile devices," UXmatters, 2013.
- [12] A. Smith, "U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015," Pew Internet, Tech. Rep., 2015.
- [13] I. Lunden, "6.1B Smartphone Users Globally By 2020, Overtaking Basic Fixed Phone Subscriptions," TechCrunch, 2015.
- [14] M. Loge, "Tell Me Who You Are, and I Will Tell You Your Lock Pattern," Passwords, 2015.