The proportion of malicious bots on the web is on the rise [7]. As of 2023, bots constitute around 47.5% of online traffic [10], with 63.6% of those being malicious bots. Fraudsters employ such bots to launch a multitude of cyberattacks including financial fraud [6], click fraud [5], account takeover [13], unauthorized scraping [3] etc., resulting in billions of dollars of loss to the industry.

To counter this threat, commercial anti-bot services detect and block requests generated by bots. Researchers have shown that such services employ browser fingerprinting to detect bots without disrupting the user experience of legitimate users [15], [2]. These fingerprints capture attributes of the device/browser of the user sending the request and can be used to differentiate between real users and bots.

Despite the presence of such services, industry reports a how a rise in the number of advanced bots that can alter their identities to evade detection [10]. One way in which bots can alter their identities is to alter their browser attributes to change their browser fingerprints [9], [11]. We refer to the fingerprints of bots that are able to evade detection as elusive fingerprints. It is imperative to characterize elusive fingerprints and understand the extent to which bots can modify their fingerprints in order to devise countermeasures to bolster bot detection.

Researchers have studied bot fingerprints by employing their own bots [1], [15] or by focusing on bots that naturally discover their honey sites [12]. Thus, their work does not capture the elusive fingerprints employed by bots seeking to evade detection in the wild. Recent research [17] by Wu et al., performs a large scale characterization of the differences between human and bot fingerprints in the wild. However, they use the decisions from their bot detection system to distinguish between human and bot fingerprints. Thus, their research cannot identify the fingerprints employed by bots that can evade their system.

In this paper, we perform the first large-scale measurement of elusive fingerprints. Concretely, we purchase traffic from different sellers and drive them to different versions of our honey site. We designed these versions to only differ in terms of the presence of random strings in their URL. These random strings ensure that the requests recorded at each version originated from their corresponding sellers and no one else. These sellers advertise their traffic as being realistic and natural, indicating that they likely employ elusive fingerprints to ensure they don’t get detected as bots. We also integrate two commercial bot detection services (DataDome and BotD) on all versions of our site that predict if each request originated from a bot or a human. Since all requests originate from bots, true positives in their predictions correspond to bot requests that were detected while false negatives correspond to requests that evaded detection. Our honey sites, thus, provide strong ground truth to analyze bots with elusive fingerprints.

We received over 500,000 requests from 20 different sellers over a period of 6 months. DataDome had an accuracy of 55% and BotD had an accuracy of 44% on these requests. We identified browser attributes that aid in evasion by analyzing differences in the distribution of browser attributes across requests that were detected as bots against those that evaded detection. We used results from this analysis to alter browser attributes of our own bots to have them evade detection.

To further push the boundary of elusive fingerprints, we adopted techniques from adversarial machine learning [8], [16], [4] to automatically alter the fingerprints of requests in our dataset that were previously detected to have them evade detection. These techniques have predominantly been applied in domains such as images where there are no restrictions on adversarial perturbations since inputs can take any real value. Browser attributes include a combination of real, discrete, categorical and binary values. Thus, in order to remain practical, adversarial perturbations have to respect these domain specific constraints when applied to browser fingerprints. Taking inspiration from prior research [18], we enforce these constraints on perturbations produced by the Fast Gradient Sign Method [8]. We practically demonstrate these perturbations being successful in converting previously detected fingerprints into elusive fingerprints by evading BotD and DataDome.

We attribute the threat of elusive fingerprints (and their adversarial perturbations) to the unrestricted freedom that bots have towards altering browser attributes. However, we crucially observe that the freedom to alter any attribute without restrictions introduces avenues for inconsistent combination of attributes that cannot exist in the real world. We hypothesize that it is difficult for bots to guarantee that the fingerprints that emerge as a result of their alterations are consistent and will exist in the real world. In contrast, fingerprints of benign users can never be inconsistent by virtue of not having any alterations made to their browser attributes. We
thus believe that inconsistencies provide an interesting avenue towards detecting elusive fingerprints. While prior research has proposed the use of inconsistencies for bot detection [14], [15], they rely on anecdotes to define inconsistencies. Coming up with such anecdotes is a manual process which is time consuming. We propose a semi-automated, data-driven approach to discovering inconsistencies. Our approach uses our dataset of bot requests to identify combinations of features that occur rarely to propose them as potential inconsistencies. We then manually vet these combinations to ensure that we do not consider a rare occurrence in the real-world as an inconsistency. Our inconsistency analysis revealed inconsistent combination of features in the elusive fingerprints from the wild as well as our adversarially generated fingerprints.

Our contributions include:
- The first large-scale measurement and characterization of "elusive fingerprints" - the fingerprints of bots that are able to evade commercial bot detection services.
- The development of techniques to automatically alter bot fingerprints that help with evasion to push the boundary of elusive fingerprints.
- A novel, semi-automated approach to discovering inconsistencies in browser fingerprints as a means of detecting evasive bot behavior.

REFERENCES

Etrigan: Large Scale Adversarial Analysis of Elusive Bots

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Problem Statement

- Proportion of malicious bots on the web is on the rise
  - Bots constitute 47.5% of online traffic
  - 63.6% of bots are malicious
- Commercial bot detection services make use of browser fingerprinting to detect such malicious bots
- Advanced bots evade detection by changing their browser attributes and altering their fingerprints (creating elusive fingerprints)
- It is imperative to understand how evasive these elusive fingerprints can be and create defenses against these advanced bots

Project Goals

- Perform large-scale measurement of advanced bots in the wild
- Analyze evasive performance of advanced bots against commercial bot detection services
- Analyze inconsistencies in elusive fingerprints as a defence
- Demonstrate it’s possible to adversarially create fingerprints to evade bot detection

Measurement

- We deploy honey sites on randomly generated endpoints of our master domain, and each endpoint is shared with a bot traffic source
- We integrated BotD and DataDome (commercial bot detection services) and also collect additional fingerprints using FingerprintJS and CreepJS

Adversarial Fingerprints

- We adopt techniques from adversarial machine learning to automatically alter fingerprints of network requests
- We prove efficacy of our adversarial model by altering fingerprints of detected bot requests
- Our experiment on BotD shows that it is possible to evade detection 100% of times when using our adversarial model to perturb attributes of detect bots

Inconsistency Analysis

- We perform large scale analysis to show that altering fingerprints result in inconsistencies between different browser attributes
- Changing attributes obtained through one JavaScript API creates inconsistencies with other APIs which relay similar information
- We report more than 50 inconsistencies across different features in our dataset

(a) Heatmap of geographical locations inferred using the browser’s timezone APIs
(b) Heatmap of geographical locations inferred from IP address