Stealthy Porn: Understanding Real-World Adversarial Images for Illicit Online Promotion

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A Case in the Wild



t.cn

Sina's URL shortener service



p*.z*.s*.com

SoHu redirector



s*.top

landing domain

Evade

Illicit content detector

Sexual stream

Adversarial Images in the Real-World

APPIs

Adversarial Promotional Porn Images

APPIs are Different

Adversarial Exampl







ted Images

- small noise
- nearly indistingui ess

APPIs Composition

Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn



Two common characters:

- Promotional content.
- less obfuscated explicit content

Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn

promotional content

evasiveness



image type

explicit content

APPIs

Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn



Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn



Malèna: Promotional Content Identifier

Text:

✓ PiexlLink

QRcode:

✗ ZBar, ZXing, BoofCV

✓ ~~WeChat~~

Malèna: Promotional Content Identifier

Text:

PiexlLink

QRcode:



Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn



Malèna: Regional Explicit Content Detector

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

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

Malèna: Finding Stealthy Porn



Malèna: Performance

- Performance: 91% precision , 85% recall

TABLE I: Precision and recall at different stages.

stage	precision	recall
promotional content identification	98%	90%
ROI locator	89%	96%
explicit content detection	80%	93%
overall	91%	85%

- Result: 4,353/6,163 APPIs , from 4M images, 76K posts (Baidu Tieba, Weibo)

Measurement

- Visual pattern.
- Promotional content.
- Distribution channels.

Measurement: Visual Pattern



Blu

Noise



Texture



Transparentization

Occlusion

TABLE III: The usage of 7 obfuscation techniques.

obfuscation technique	# APPI (%)
color manipulation	160 (3.7%)
rotation	1,083 (24.9%)
noising	2,130 (48.9%)
texturing	132 (3.0%)
blurring	829 (19.0%)
occlusion	1,517 (34.8%)
transparentization & overlap	46 (1.0%)

Measurement: Visual Pattern

- Rotation
  - ➤ 45 and 135 degrees are effective



Fig. 10: Explicit content detection results on the distorted images.

Measurement: Visual Pattern

- Rotation
  - ➤ 45 and 135 degrees are effective
- Noising
  - ➤ Less noising is enough



Fig. 10: Explicit content detection results on the distorted images.

Measurement: Visual Pattern

- Rotation
  - ➤ 45 and 135 degrees are effective
- Noising
  - ➤ Less noising is enough
- Color-manipulation
  - ➤ Green is evasive colour



Fig. 10: Explicit content detection results on the distorted images.

Measurement: Promotional Content



TABLE VI: Statistics of promotional content.

Type	Weibo	Weibo (unique)	Tieba	Tieba (unique)
QQ ID	17	7	186	69
Weibo ID	375	261	8	5
WeChat ID	239	110	1092	135
QR code	0	0	1430	45
URL	0	0	85	31



Measurement: Promotional Content



TABLE VII: Examples of sensitive text replacement.

Examples	Type	Meaning	Num
v♥	emoji	WeChat	12
“刊片”	homophonic	porn movie	10
“企鹅”	jargon	QQ	18
“呦呦”	jargon	child porn	8
vx	homophonic+initial	WeChat	39

Measurement: Promotional Content





Reuse of promotional content

232 / 612 (37%)

Reuse of explicit content

3981 / 4353 (91%)

Measurement: Promotional Content



TABLE VIII: Top 5 APPI campaigns.

Campaign	# APPIs	Source
1	1,325	Tieba
2	786	Tieba
3	347	Weibo
4	39	Weibo&Tieba
5	25	Tieba

Reuse

232

ntent

3981 / 4353 (91%)

Measurement: Distribution Channels

Compromised accounts:

- rarely post
- comment only on hot microblog

Dedicated accounts:

- > 30 posts/day
- with meaningless sentences



Lession Learned

Visual pattern.	→	Harden current models.
Promotional content.	→	Regularize promotion channel.
Distribution channels.	→	Secure accounts.

Take-aways

- APPIs are prevalent
- Understanding criminal goal and ecosystem behind adversarial images
- Hardening machine learning model against APPI attack deserves further studies

Thank You!