Revisiting Square Root ORAM

Efficient Random Access in Multi-Party Computation

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Secure multi-party computation applications



Set intersection
[FNP04]

Iris code matching
[LCPLB12]



Matrix factorization for
recommendations
[NIWJTB13]



Median computation
[AMP04]



Linear ridge-regression
[NWIJBT13]

Random Access




```
void oscrypt_smix(obliv uint8_t * B, s
  ...

  for (i = 0; i < N; i += 2) {
    j = integerify(X, r) & (N - 1);
    temp = V2[j];
    xorBits(X,temp,32*r);
    oscrypt_blockmix_salsa8(X, Y, r);

    j = integerify(Y, r) & (N - 1);
    temp = V2[j];

    for (size_t jj = 0; jj < 32 * r; j
      Y[jj] ^= temp[jj];
    }
```

Hiding access pattern

Linear scan



Access every element

Per-access cost: $\Theta(n)$

Oblivious RAM



Continually shuffle elements around

Per-access cost: $\Theta(\log^p n)$



Figure from: Wang, Chan, Shi. **Circuit Oram.** CCS'15



Circuit ORAM Faster
Square-Root ORAM Faster
(our work)
Linear Scan Faster
Number of Blocks
2^{20}
2^{18}
2^{16}
2^{14}
2^{12}
2^{10}
2^{8}
2^{6}
2^{4}
2^{2} 2^{3} 2^{4} 2^{5} 2^{6} 2^{7} 2^{8} 2^{9} 2^{10} 2^{11} 2^{12}
Block Size (bytes)

Approach: revisit old schemes

Classic “square root” scheme by Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996).



Considered slow for MPC because of per-access hash evaluation.

Per-access amortized cost: $\Theta(\sqrt{n}\log n)$

Four-element ORAM



Larger Sizes



4-Block ORAM



Cost: $5B$ + $B + 2B + 3B$ + ...

= $11B$ every 3 accesses

Comparison

Linear scan



Cost: $4B = 12B/3$

Our scheme



Cost: $11B/3$

Four-element ORAM



Larger Sizes



Position map



Creating position map



x	$\pi(x)$
0	2
1	0
2	4
3	1
4	7
5	6
6	3
7	5

Creating position map



x	$\pi(x)$
0	4
1	1
2	3
3	6
4	0
5	2
6	7
7	5

Inverse permutation



π_A

$\pi_B = \pi_A \cdot p$

Inverse permutation



Rinse and repeat

1. Shuffle elements
2. Recreate position map
3. Service $T = \sqrt{n \log n}$ accesses

Access time


Running Time per Access (seconds)
10^2
10^1
10^0
10^-1
10^-2
10^-3
10^-4
Linear Scan
Circuit ORAM
Square-Root ORAM
2^3
2^5
2^7
2^9
2^11
2^13
2^15
2^17
2^19
Number of Blocks

Initialization cost



Benchmarks

Task	Parameters	Linear scan	Circuit ORAM	Square-root ORAM
Binary search	2^{10} searches 2^{15} elements	1020 s	5041 s	825 s
Breadth-first search	2^{10} vertices 2^{13} edges	4570 s	3750 s	680 s
Stable matching	2^{9} pairs	-	189000 s	119000 s
scrypt hashing	$N = 2^{14}$	≈ 7 days	2850 s	1920 s

Conclusion

We revisited a well-known scheme and used it to

- Lower initialization cost
- Improve breakeven point

Shows that asymptotic costs are not the final word, concrete costs require more consideration.

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