SEPT. 2021

ANDRUSPEX: LEVERAGING GRAPH REPRESENTATION LEARNING TO PREDICT HARMFUL APP (PHA) INSTALLATIONS ON MOBILE DEVICES

YUN SHEN

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Overview

- **Motivation**

- **Technical Details**

- **Results**

- **Limitations**

Motivation

original status

PHA installation

PHA removal

t_1 t_2 t_3

Motivation

original status

PHA installation

PHA removal

d_1 — m_1, m_5

d_1 — m_1, m_5, ⟨m_3⟩

d_1 — m_1, m_5

t_1

t_2

t_3

Google Bouncer
Google Play Protect

Market policies (?) *

* Kotzias, Platon, Juan Caballero, and Leyla Bilge. "How did that get in my phone? unwanted app distribution on android devices IEEE S&P, 2021

Motivation

original status

d_1

m_1

m_5

t_1

PHA installation

d_1

m_1

m_5

m_3

t_2

PHA removal

d_1

m_1

m_5

t_3

Google Play Protect
AV products

Customer's willingness to remove PHAs (?)

Motivation

original status

PHA installation

PHA removal

t_1

t_2

t_3

window of opportunity

Motivation

Motivation

original status

d_1

m_1

m_5

PHA installation

d_1

m_1

m_5

m_3

PHA removal

d_1

m_1

m_5

t_1

ANDRUSPEX

t_2

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Google Bouncer
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# Motivation

original status

d_1 m_1 m_5

PHA installation

d_1 m_1 m_5 m_3

PHA removal

d_1 m_1 m_5

t_1

ANDRUSPEX

t_2

t_3

window of opportunity

Warn the end users in advance of what PHAs they might encounter in the future

Challenge

device perspective

Very sparse data

Challenge

Challenge

1 device perspective

aggregate historical information of how the PHAs have been installed by mobile devices globally

2 global perspective

d1 — m1, m5
d2 — m2, m3, m4
d3 — m5
d4 — m3, m5
d5 — m4

d1 — m1
d2 — m2
d3
d4
d5 — m3, m4, m5

Prediction?

Scalability?

Technical Details

Malware

Device

Observed Malware
Installation info
during [**ti, tj**]

Missing Malware
Installation info
during [**ti, tj**]

Prediction target

lack of data to do causality inference

Technical Details

Use random walk to model user's random installation behaviour

Technical Details

2-hop

1. PHAs with larger installations (i.e., popular PHAs) are co-existing with smaller ones (i.e., less popular PHAs)

2. Correlation coefficient decreases with the increasing number of hops

PHA degrees (x-axis) and the average degrees of all vertices reachable by 2/4-hops (y-axis)

4-hop

Technical Details

Random walk length

Technical Details

decay function

discriminate the strength between different orders of proximity

	m₁	m₂	m₃	m₄	m₅
d₁	1st	3rd	2nd	3rd	1st
d₂	2nd	1st	1st	1st	2nd
d₃	2nd	3rd	2nd	3rd	1st
d₄	2nd	2nd	1st	2nd	1st
d₅		2nd	2nd	1st	3rd

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{\substack{1 \le l \le K \\ d_i,(m_j,m_{j'})}} C(l) \mathbb{E}_{\substack{m_j \sim P_{d_i}^l \\ m_{j'} \sim P_N}} \left[\mathcal{F}(\phi_{d_i}^T \phi_{m_j}, \phi_{d_i}^T \phi_{m_j}) \right]$$
$$+ \lambda_\Phi \|\Phi\|_2^2 \qquad (1)$$

$$P_{v_x}^l(v_y) = \begin{cases} \frac{\mathbf{A}_{v_x,v_y} deg(v_y)}{\sum_{v_{y'}} \mathbf{A}_{v_x,v_{y'}} deg(v_{y'})} & l=1, v_x \in \mathbf{D} \\ \frac{\mathbf{A}_{v_y,v_x} deg(v_y)}{\sum_{v_{y'}} \mathbf{A}_{v_{y'},v_x} deg(v_{y'})} & l=1, v_x \in \mathbf{M} \\ p_{v_x}^1(v_\alpha) p_{v_\alpha}^{l-1}(v_\beta) p_{v_\beta}^1(v_y) & otherwise \end{cases}$$
$$(2)$$

$[\Phi_{d_1}, \Phi_{m_1}]$

$[\Phi_{d_3}, \Phi_{m_3}]$

...

$[\Phi_{d_z}, \Phi_{m_i}]$

$[\Phi_{d_m}, \Phi_{m_j}]$

Device   PHA

Edge representation

random walk approximation to approximate the matrix factorization *

* Feng Niu, Benjamin Recht, Christopher Re, and Stephen J. Wright. 2011. HOGWILD!: A Lock-free Approach to Parallelizing Stochastic Gradient Descent. NIPS, 2011

Technical Details

Edge representation

	m_1	m_2	m_3	m_4	m_5
d_1	1st	3rd	2nd	3rd	1st
d_2	2nd	1st	1st	1st	2nd
d_3	2nd	3rd	2nd	3rd	1st
d_4	2nd	2nd	1st	2nd	1st
d_5		2nd	2nd	1st	3rd

$\xrightarrow{\text{matrix factorisation}}$

$$[\ \Phi_{d_1}, \Phi_{m_1}\ ]$$

$$[\ \Phi_{d_3}, \Phi_{m_3}\ ]$$

$$\cdots$$

$$[\ \Phi_{d_z}, \Phi_{m_i}\ ]$$

$$[\ \Phi_{d_m}, \Phi_{m_j}\ ]$$

Legend: Neg. Edges, Pos. Edges

Observed PHA installations

Technical Details

raw data

PHA
installation
graph

low-dimensional
edge
representation

predictions

$(d_1 \quad m_1 \quad t_1)$

$(d_3 \quad m_4 \quad t_2)$

...

$(d_z \quad m_i \quad t_i)$

$(d_m \quad m_j \quad t_i)$

❶

**PHA
Installation
Graph**

❷

**Graph
Rep.
Learning**

$[\ \Phi_{d_1}, \Phi_{m_1}\ ]$

$[\ \Phi_{d_3}, \Phi_{m_3}\ ]$

...

$[\ \Phi_{d_z}, \Phi_{m_i}\ ]$

$[\ \Phi_{d_m}, \Phi_{m_j}\ ]$

❸

**Prediction
Engine**

Build global PHA installation graph

Collect PHA installation events from the mobile endpoints

**Edge (installation)
representation**

**Binary classifier
(i.e., give a device and
a PHA, predict the
Probability there is an edge
connecting them)**

Dataset

Dataset	Period	Training				Period	Test			
		Ratio	# Events	# Dev	# Apps		Ratio	# Events	# Devs	# Apps
DS_1	00:00 - 18:00 (Mar. 1)	0.73	844,531	644,823	63,650	18:00 - 24:00 (Mar. 1)	0.27	317,474	189,327	26,083
DS_2	March 1 - 6	0.86	2,050,865	1,272,505	99,464	March 7	0.14	334,383	237,594	32,961
DS_3	March 1 - 24	0.84	3,194,838	1,864,021	131,903	March 25 - 31	0.16	599,458	404,417	47,099

One day

One week

One month

31 days of PHA detection data in March 2019

Results

|	One day					One week					One month				
	DS_1					DS_2					DS_3				
Method	TPR @ 0.0001	TPR @ 0.001	TPR @ 0.005	ROC AUC	AP	TPR @ 0.0001	TPR @ 0.001	TPR @ 0.005	ROC AUC	AP	TPR @ 0.0001	TPR @ 0.001	TPR @ 0.005	ROC AUC	AP
Pref. Attach.	0.072	0.268	0.512	0.977	0.974	0.099	0.310	0.593	0.980	0.978	0.094	0.338	0.584	0.981	0.980
1st-order prox.	0.782	0.898	0.936	0.983	0.986	0.837	0.927	0.950	0.982	0.986	0.844	0.927	0.965	0.990	0.990
2nd-order prox.	0.863	0.922	0.959	0.992	0.993	0.867	0.918	0.953	0.993	0.993	0.868	0.941	0.966	0.993	0.994
high-order prox.	0.873	0.969	0.985	0.997	0.997	0.893	0.957	0.977	0.996	0.996	0.879	0.951	0.978	0.995	0.996
ANDRUSPEX	**0.991**	**0.996**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.994**	**0.997**	**0.998**	**0.999**	**0.999**	**0.992**	**0.996**	**0.997**	**0.999**	**0.999**

(a) DS_1 (b) DS_2 (c) DS_3

Andruspex

higher false positive rate leads to worse user experience hence potentially **higher customer churn rate**

Resilience to data latency

Dataset	Training ratio	Data latency ratio	Test ratio	TPR @ 0.0001	TPR @ 0.001	TPR @ 0.005	ROC AUC	AP
DS_2	0.86	0.00	0.14	0.994	0.997	0.998	0.9994	0.9995
	0.79	0.07	0.14	0.994	0.997	0.998	0.9994	0.9995
	0.70	0.16	0.14	0.993	0.997	0.998	0.9994	0.9995
	0.61	0.25	0.14	0.991	0.994	0.997	0.996	0.995
DS_3	0.839	0.00	0.161	0.992	0.995	0.997	0.9994	0.9995
	0.769	0.07	0.161	0.992	0.995	0.997	0.9992	0.9994
	0.679	0.16	0.161	0.991	0.994	0.995	0.9992	0.994
	0.589	0.25	0.161	0.990	0.992	0.994	0.996	0.997

Limitations

- **Node attributes not involved (i.e., structure-based)**

- **<u>Transductive</u> setting**

  - Global installation graph must be rebuilt

  - Frequent retraining required

- **Predict known PHAs**

- **Effective notification system**

THANK YOU

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