

Contact: Samira.Briongos@neclab.eu, ida.bruhns@uni-luebeck.de

# Aim, Wait, Shoot: How the CacheSniper Technique Improves Unprivileged Cache Attacks

**Samira Briongos<sup>1</sup>, Ida Bruhns<sup>2</sup>,** Pedro Malagón<sup>3</sup>, Thomas Eisenbarth<sup>2</sup> and José M. Moya<sup>3</sup> <sup>1</sup>NEC Laboratories Europe, <sup>2</sup>Universität zu Lübeck, <sup>3</sup>Universidad Politécnica de Madrid

September 10, 2021

JNIVERSITÄT ZU LÜBECK





© NEC Corporation 2021

### **Cache attacks and countermeasures**

Traditional cache attacks: Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe.

- 1: function victim\_function
- 2: :
- 3:
- 4:
- 5: *load* table[secret]
- 6: end function

- Attacker:
  - Removes table[ secret ] from the cache.
  - Waits for the victim to execute.
  - Looks for table [secret] in the cache.
    - If it is in the cache: victim has used it.
    - If not: victim has not used it.
  - Infers the value of secret.

### **Cache attacks and countermeasures**

One possible countermeasure: prefetching or always-load-strategy

#### 1: function victim function

- 2:
- 3:
- 4: *load* table
- 5: *load* table[secret]
- 6: end function

#### Idea:

- Ensure the entire table is always available in the cache.
- Limit the attacker capabilities: she can not distinguish. whether the access is due to prefetching or not.
- Easy to implement.
- Applied in different cryptographic libraries.
  - It does not remove secret dependent access to the cache.

## Window for attack

Prefetch-protected implementations can still be attacked.



#### Attacker's challenges:

- 1. Detect the victim's execution of the target algorithm.
- 2. Determine the state of the target after detection.
- 3. Calculate the remaining time until data is prefetched.
- 4. Evict the target data from the LLC at the desired instant.

### **Detect and determine state**

Tested Flush+Reload, Prime+Probe and TSX-Abort for detection.



◆ TSX is the best approach for synchronization.

Data mapping to the same location of the target is loaded into a transaction.

- An abort signal is received as soon as the victim starts executing the target algorithm.
- Time between victim's call and abort is almost constant  $\rightarrow$  Victim state is known after abort.

### **Detect and determine state**

Tested Flush+Reload, Prime+Probe and TSX-Abort for detection.



#### TSX is the best approach for synchronization.

- Data mapping to the same location of the target is loaded into a transaction.
- An abort signal is received as soon as the victim starts executing the target algorithm.
- Time between victim's call and abort is almost constant  $\rightarrow$  Victim state is known after abort.

- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.

- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.
  - Known LLC replacement policy
  - Controlled cache state (Transactional Memory)



- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.
  - Known LLC replacement policy
  - Controlled cache state (Transactional Memory)



Stage 1	Content	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н
	Age	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.
  - Known LLC replacement policy
  - Controlled cache state (Transactional Memory)



SINGLE ACCESS EVICTION

- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.
  - Known LLC replacement policy
  - Controlled cache state (Transactional Memory)



SINGLE ACCESS EVICTION

- Attacker can profile the target code beforehand and find the time elapsed between point of detection and prefetch.
- Evict the target data at the right instant.
  - Known LLC replacement policy
  - Controlled cache state (Transactional Memory)



SINGLE ACCESS EVICTION

### **Targets**

◆ AES software implementations of OpenSSL.

- S-Box implementation.
- 4 cache lines in total.
- Prefetch the table before each round.

Parameter	T-Table	S-Box
Detection target T1	AES_encrypt	S-Box (Prefetch in first round)
Eviction target T2	Tei[0]	S-Box (After Prefetch in last round)
Samples required	360	≈500000

#### **Targets**

◆ RSA implementation of wolfSSL (CVE-2020-15309).

```
Require: base b, modulo m, exponent e = (e_{n-1} \dots e_0)_2
Ensure: b^e \pmod{m}
1: init(R);
2: for i from n-1 downto 0 do
     mul(R[0], R[1], R[e_i]));
3:
     modRed(R[e_i]);
4:
5:
      sqr(R[2], R[2]);
6:
       modRed(R[2]);
7:
                                      \diamond 96,8% of the multiply operations detected.
8: end for
                                      \diamond 87.6% precision identifying e_i.
9: return R;
```

### Conclusions

Prefetching does not work even if the attacker is unprivileged.

- If she can synchronize with the victim and achieve fast cache evictions.
- ◆ TSX works well for the synchronization.
  - The changes made to the cache are not reverted.
- ◆ We showed a technique for single access eviction.
  - AIM: Prepare the scenario for the attack.
  - WAIT: For the right moment.
  - SHOOT: Evict data from the cache.
- Demonstration with two real world targets.
  - AES (S-Box Openssl).
  - RSA (WolfSSL).

# Thank you for your attention

Source code: https://github.com/greenlsi/CacheSniper Contact: : Samira.Briongos@neclab.eu, ida.bruhns@uni-luebeck.de

**\Orchestrating** a brighter world





