

University of Luxembourg

Interdisciplinary Centre for Security,  
Reliability and Trust

# ConFuzzius: A Data Dependency-Aware Hybrid Fuzzer for Smart Contracts

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## A \$50 MILLION HACK JUST SHOWED THAT THE DAO WAS ALL TOO HUMAN

20 JULY 2017 / #ETHEREUM #BLOCKCHAIN #SECURITY

## A hacker stole \$31M of Ether – how it happened, and what it means for Ethereum

SpankChain, a cryptocurrency project focused on the adult industry, has suffered a breach that saw almost \$40,000 in ethereum (ETH) stolen.

## Wallet bug freezes more than \$150 million worth of Ethereum



## A hackers' dream payday: Ledf.Me and Uniswap lose \$25 million worth of cryptocurrency



by Alina Bizga on April 21, 2020

# Smart Contract Security Challenges

```
6 contract TokenSale {
7   uint256 start = now;
8   uint256 end = now + 30 days;
9   address wallet = 0xcafebabe...;
10  Token token = Token(0x12345678...);
11
12  address owner;
13  bool sold;
14
15  function Tokensale() public {
16    owner = msg.sender;
17  }
18
19  function buy() public payable {
20    require(now < end);
21    require(msg.value == 42 ether + (now - start)
22           / 60 / 60 / 24 * 1 ether);
23    require(token.transferFrom(this, msg.sender,
24                               token.allowance(wallet, this)));
25    sold = true;
26  }
27
28  function withdraw() public {
29    require(msg.sender == owner);
30    require(now >= end);
31    require(sold);
32    owner.transfer(address(this).balance);
33  }
34 }
```

## Stateful exploration

Solution: read-after-write data dependency


## Input generation

Solution: Input generation via symbolic execution


## Environmental dependency

Solution: Model and fuzz environmental inputs

# ConFuzzius



# Encoding Individuals



- Access to state variables is retrieved dynamically via `SLOAD` and `SSTORE` instructions.
- Retrieve storage variable from storage location:

- Statically-sized:

- Includes: primitives, structs, and fixed arrays.
- Pop first element from stack.

- Dynamically-sized:

- Mappings: Map result of `SHA3` instruction to memory contents and only extract the last 32 bytes (concatenation).
- Dynamic Arrays: keep track of arithmetic additions of `SHA3` hashes.

Variable Type	Declaration	Access	Storage Location
Primitive	<code>T v</code>	<code>v</code>	<code>s(v)</code>
Struct	<code>struct v { T a }</code>	<code>v.a</code>	<code>s(v) + s(a)</code>
Fixed Array	<code>T[10] v</code>	<code>v[n]</code>	<code>s(v) + n ·  T </code>
Dynamic Array	<code>T[] v</code>	<code>v[n]</code> <code>v.length</code>	<code>h(s(v)) + n ·  T </code> <code>s(v)</code>
Mapping	<code>mapping(T<sub>1</sub> =&gt; T<sub>2</sub>) v</code>	<code>v[k]</code>	<code>h(k    s(v))</code>

# Evaluation



## Datasets

1. Real-World dataset
  - ❑ **21,147** contracts with source code from Etherscan.
  - ❑ Clustered using k-means into a **large** cluster (**3,344** contracts) and **small** cluster (**17,803** contracts).
2. Curated dataset
  - ❑ Based on **SmartBugs** by Durieux et al. and extended with **5 additional types** from SWC registry.
  - ❑ **128 contracts** with **148 annotated vulnerabilities** across **10 different types**.

## Baselines

Toolname	Type	Requires Source Code	Requires ABI	Vulnerability Detectors									
				AF	IO	RE	TD	BD	UE	UD	LE	LO	US
OYENTE [28]	Symbolic	X	X	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	●
MYTHRIL [31]	Symbolic	X	X	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●
M-PRO [31]	Symbolic	✓	X	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●
ILF [18]	Fuzzer	✓	✓	○	○	○	○	●	●	●	●	●	●
sFUZZ [32]	Fuzzer	✓	✓	○	●	●	○	●	●	●	○	●	○
CONFUZZIUS	Hybrid	X	✓	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●


## Experimental Setup

**10 runs** with **independent seeds** with **10 min** for **small** contracts and **1 hour** for **large** contracts.


# 1<sup>st</sup> Research Question

**RQ1:** Does ConFuzzius achieve higher code coverage than current state-of-the-art symbolic execution and fuzzing tools for smart contracts?

- ❑ ConFuzzius achieves highest code coverage:
  - ❑ **91% small** contracts and **81% large** contracts
  - ❑ Every tool **struggles with large** contracts
  - ❑ **10%** difference between small and large for ConFuzzius vs. **31%** difference for symbolic execution tools (Mythril)



# Code Coverage Over Time



- ConFuzzius outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers:
  - 66% after 1 second on small contracts vs. 12% ILF and 15% sFuzz
  - 46% after 1 second on large contracts vs. 10% ILF and 11% sFuzz

**RQ2:** Does ConFuzzius discover more vulnerabilities than current state-of-the-art symbolic execution and fuzzing tools for smart contracts?


- ❑ ConFuzzius **detected most vulnerabilities** (106/148).
- ❑ All symbolic execution tools **reported false positives**, especially for integer overflows.
- ❑ ConFuzzius **does not report false positives**.
- ❑ ILF and sFuzz reported **false positives for unsafe delegatecalls** due to the imprecision of their detectors:

```
function setCallee(address newCallee)
    require(msg.sender == owner);
    callee = newCallee;
}
function forward(bytes _data) {
    require(callee.delegatecall(_data));
}
```

Toolname	Vulnerabilities										Total
	AF	IO	RE	TD	BD	UE	UD	LE	LO	US	
OYENTE	6/6	12/4	8/0	2/0	0/0	-	-	-	-	0/0	28
MYTHRIL	7/3	18/5	10/0	0/0	3/0	24/0	0/0	4/0	-	2/0	68
M-PRO	7/3	18/5	10/0	0/0	3/0	24/0	0/0	4/0	-	2/0	68
ILF	-	-	-	-	0/0	10/0	1/2	4/0	5/0	3/0	23
sFUZZ	-	12/0	7/0	-	1/0	21/0	1/2	-	0/0	-	42
CONFUZZIUS	<b>10/0</b>	<b>18/0</b>	<b>10/0</b>	<b>2/0</b>	<b>7/0</b>	<b>46/0</b>	<b>1/0</b>	<b>4/0</b>	<b>5/0</b>	<b>3/0</b>	<b>106</b>
Total Unique	14	19	11	4	7	75	1	9	5	3	148

**RQ3:** How relevant are ConFuzzius's individual components in terms of code coverage and vulnerability detection?

- ❑ We randomly selected 100 contracts from each cluster and disabled each component separately.
- ❑ Each component is an added value.
- ❑ Constraint solving plays an essential part in coverage and vulnerability detection.
- ❑ Environmental instrumentation is more relevant for detecting vulnerabilities.
- ❑ Data dependency analysis allows to find 10% and 18% more vulnerabilities in small and large contracts, respectively.





# Conclusion

- ❑ We presented **ConFuzzius** – the first **data dependency-aware hybrid fuzzer for smart contracts** that tackles the following three challenges:
  - ❑ **Input generation**: evolutionary fuzzing + constraint solving.
  - ❑ **Stateful exploration**: read-after-write access patterns across state variables.
  - ❑ **Environmental dependencies**: modelling block and contract information as fuzzable inputs.
- ❑ We compared ConFuzzius against 2 fuzzers and 3 symbolic execution tools using a **curated dataset of 128 contracts** and a **dataset of 21K real-world contracts**.
- ❑ ConFuzzius detects **more bugs** (up to **23%**) and achieves **higher code coverage** (up to **69%**).
- ❑ Our data dependency analysis can **boost the detection of bugs** (up to **18%**).

# Questions?

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All **code & data** is available on GitHub:

<https://github.com/christofortorres/ConFuzzius>

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