



Computationally sound Bitcoin tokens

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


Overview

- Smart contracts on Bitcoin? Tokens??
 - Tokens: only off-chain (no DEX!)
- Bitcoin extension: covenants (BIP 119)
 - Non-Fungible Tokens (NFT)
 - Turing-completeness (\Rightarrow proof in this paper)
 - Fungible Tokens?? (Turing-complete \nRightarrow efficient)
- New Bitcoin extension: neighbourhood covenants
 - Fungible Tokens, secure & efficient



Bitcoin transactions & scripts





```
k  
e.n  
e + e  
e - e  
e < e  
e = e  
rtx.wit
```

```
if e then e else e  
versig(k,e)  
H(e)  
...
```

NO TOKENS!

Bitcoin covenants




NFTs, symbolically

$\langle \mathbf{A}, n:\mathbb{B} \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{mint}} \langle \mathbf{A}, 1:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$


$\xrightarrow{\text{xfer}} \langle \mathbf{B}, 1:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

~~$\xrightarrow{\text{split}}$~~ $\langle \mathbf{B}, 0.5:\text{FooCoin} \rangle | \langle \mathbf{C}, 0.5:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

A non-fungible token



versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and verrec(rtxo(1))



Fungible tokens, symbolically

$\langle \mathbf{A}, n:\mathbb{B} \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{mint}} \langle \mathbf{A}, 1:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

$\xrightarrow{\text{xfer}} \langle \mathbf{B}, 1:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

$\xrightarrow{\text{split}} \langle \mathbf{B}, 0.5:\text{FooCoin} \rangle | \langle \mathbf{B}, 0.5:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

$\xrightarrow{\text{join}} \langle \mathbf{B}, 1:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$


Fungible tokens, symbolically

$\langle \mathbf{A}, 1:\mathbb{B} \rangle | \langle \mathbf{B}, 10:\text{FooCoin} \rangle$

exchg
→


$\langle \mathbf{A}, 10:\text{FooCoin} \rangle | \langle \mathbf{B}, 1:\mathbb{B} \rangle$

Fungible tokens




```
switch rtxo(1).op {  
  X -> e_xfer  
  S -> e_split  
  J -> e_join  
  ...  
}
```


A pink speech bubble containing a switch statement. The switch statement is: switch rtxo(1).op { X -> e_xfer S -> e_split J -> e_join ... }. The 'e_xfer' field is bolded.



Transfer



`versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)`
and `ctxo.tkval = rtxo(1).tkval`
and `verrec(rtxo(1))`



Split

T0
<pre>out(1):{ op: ... own: A, tkval: 10 scr: FT }</pre>

`versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)`
and `ctxo.tkval =`
 `rtxo(1).tkval + rtxo(2).tkval`
and `outlen(rtx) = 2`
and `verrec(rtxo(1))`
and `verrec(rtxo(2))`

T1
<pre>out(1):{ op: S, own: A, tkval: 1, scr: FT } out(2):{ op: ..., own: B, tkval: 9, scr: FT }</pre>

Join

T0
<pre>out(1):{ op: ... own: B, tkval: 8 scr: FT }</pre>

T1
<pre>out(1):{ op: ... own: B, tkval: 2 scr: FT }</pre>

T2
<pre>out(1):{ op: J, own: A, tkval: 10, scr: FT }</pre>

```
versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and inlen(rtx) = 1
and outlen(rtx) = 1
and verrec(rtxo(1))
and rtxo(1).tkval =
  ctxo.tkval +
  T0.out(1).tkval
and verrec(T0.out(1))
```

needs ref to
sibling

Neighbourhood covenants: checking siblings


T0
<pre>out(1):{ op: ... own: B, tkval: 8 scr: FT }</pre>

T1
<pre>out(1):{ op: ... own: B, tkval: 2 scr: FT }</pre>

T2
<pre>out(1):{ op: J, own: A, tkval: 10, scr: FT }</pre>

```
versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and inlen(rtx) = 1
and outlen(rtx) = 1
and verrec(rtxo(1))
and rtxo(1).tkval =
  stxo(1).tkval +
  stxo(2).tkval
and verrec(stxo(1))
and verrec(stxo(2))
```

Attack: joining different tokens



```
versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and inlen(rtx) = 1
and outlen(rtx) = 1
and verrec(rtxo(1))
and rtxo(1).tkval =
  stxo(1).tkval +
  stxo(2).tkval
and verrec(stxo(1))
and verrec(stxo(2))
```


Preserving transaction identifiers

```
MintA
in(1): ...
out(1):{ op: M
        own: A,
        tkval: 10
        txid: FooToken
        scr: FT }
```




versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and ctxo.tkval = rtxo(1).tkval
and verrec(rtxo(1))
and **ctxo.tkid = rtxo(1).tkid**

tkid must be preserved by all ops

Thwarting the attack



Attack: forging tokens





Linking tx identifiers to the token generator

MintA
<pre>in(1): T0 out(1):{ op: M own: A, tkval: 10 txid: H(T0) scr: FT }</pre>

```
versig(ctxo.own, rtx.wit)
and ctxo.tkval = rtxo(1).tkval
and verrec(rtxo(1))
and ctxo.tkid = rtxo(1).tkid
and ctxo.tkid = txid(ptxo(1))
```

Thwarting the attack



ctxo.tkid ≠ txid(ptxo(1))

Computational soundness

Theorem: any execution in the computational model (Bitcoin)
has a corresponding execution in the symbolic one^{*}

Therefore, the Bitcoin encoding of fungible tokens has **no attacks**
(otherwise, these attacks would have been observable in the symbolic model)

^{*} (with overwhelming probability)

Conclusions

- Covenants increase the expressive power of Bitcoin contracts
- “Forward” covenants not enough for efficient fungible tokens:
 - split & join operations hide security threats!!
 - **neighbourhood covenants** can also inspect siblings & parent
 - minimal impact on the implementation & efficiency of Bitcoin
 - computational soundness of fungible tokens

Thank you! Questions?