

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.

Efficient Algorithms for Quantitative Attack Tree Analysis

Carlos E. Budde[†] & Mariëlle Stoelinga^{†*}

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
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

m.i.a.stoelinga@utwente.nl





CSF — June 23, 2021






Attack Tree models





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



Attack Tree models



Basic
Attack
Steps



Attack Tree models & metrics



Basic
Attack
Steps

120	40	0	Time Cost Prob.	0.1	120	1
0	30	0		0	0	0
0.07	0.01	0.95		0.001	0.6	0.05

Attack Tree models & metrics



Basic
Attack
Steps

40
0
0.07
PIN


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0	30	0
0.07	0.01	0.95

Time
Cost
Prob.


0.1	120	1
0	0	0
0.001	0.6	0.05

120
0
0.03
Pick


Attack Tree models & metrics



Static AT



Dynamic AT



Basic
Attack
Steps

40
0
0.07
PIN


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0	30	0
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Cost
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

120
0
0.03
Pick

Attack Tree models & metrics



Static AT

Dynamic AT



	Static	Dynamic
Tree	① S-tree	③ D-tree
DAG	② S-DAG	④ D-DAG

Basic
Attack
Steps

40
0
0.07
PIN


120
0
0.07
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Time
Cost
Prob.

0.1
0
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Pick

Algorithms to compute metrics




	①	②	③	④
Metric	Static tree	Static DAG	Dynamic tree	Dynamic DAG
min cost	BU [14, 15, 16]	MTBDD [17] \mathcal{C} -BU [18]	BU [4]	PTA [8]
min time	BU [14, 19]	Petri nets [12]	APH [9] BU [4]	PTA [8]
min skill	BU [14, 20]	\mathcal{C} -BU [18]	BU [4]	—
max damage	BU [14, 19, 20]	MTBDD [17] DPLL [7]	BU [4]	PTA [8]
probability	BU [6, 19]	BDD [21] DPLL [7]	APH [9]	I/O-IMC [5]
Pareto fronts	BU [22, 19]	\mathcal{C} -BU [11]	OPEN PROBLEM	PTA [8]
Any of the above	Algo. 1: BU _{SAT}	Algo. 2: BDD _{DAG}	Algo. 5: BU _{DAT}	OPEN PROBLEM
<i>k</i> -top metrics	BU-projection [14]	Algo. 3: BDD shortest_paths	OPEN PROBLEM	OPEN PROBLEM

	Static	Dynamic
Tree	① S-tree	③ D-tree
DAG	② S-DAG	④ D-DAG

BU: bottom-up on the AT structure. **APH**: acyclic phase-type (time distribution). **BDD**: binary decision diagram. **MTBDD**: multi-terminal BDD. **\mathcal{C} -BU**: repeated BU, identifying clones. **DPLL**: DPPL SAT-solving in the AT formula. **PTA**: priced time automata (semantics). **I/O-IMC**: input/output interactive Markov chains (semantics).

AT syntax & metric on semantics




Definition (AT). An *attack tree* is a tuple $T = (N, t, ch)$ where:


- N is a finite set of *nodes*;
- $t: N \rightarrow \{\text{BAS, OR, AND, SAND}\}$ gives the *type* of each node;
- $ch: N \rightarrow N^*$ gives the sequence of *children* of a node.

Moreover, T satisfies the following constraints:

- (N, E) is a connected DAG, where $E = \{(v, u) \in N^2 \mid u \in ch(v)\}$;
- T has a unique root, denoted $R_T: \exists! R_T \in N. \forall v \in N. R_T \notin ch(v)$;
- BAS_T nodes are the leaves of : $\forall v \in N. t(v) = \text{BAS} \Leftrightarrow ch(v) = \varepsilon$.



AT syntax & metric on semantics




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
- \mathbb{N} is a finite set of *nodes*;
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
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
AND

OR

BAS



AT syntax & metric on semantics




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
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AT syntax & metric on semantics




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


Definition (Metric). Given an AT and a set V of values:

1. an *attribution* $\alpha: \text{BAS} \rightarrow V$ assigns an *attribute value* $\alpha(a)$ to each basic attack step a ;
2. an *attack metric* $\hat{\alpha}: \mathcal{A}_T \rightarrow V$ assigns a value $\hat{\alpha}(A)$ to an attack A ;
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AT syntax & metric on semantics




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


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


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
$$\hat{\alpha}(\text{“do } a \text{ and } c\text{”}) = 7$$

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


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


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
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	Static	Dynamic
Tree	❶ S-tree	❸ D-tree
DAG	❷ S-DAG	❹ D-DAG

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$$\alpha$$

$$V = \{ 3, 1, 4 \}$$

$$\hat{\alpha}(\text{“do } a \text{ and } c\text{”}) = 7$$


$$\check{\alpha}(\text{“any } T \text{ attack”}) = 1$$

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
Static AT semantics (no order in attacks)



- An **attack** is a set of BAS of the AT: $A \subseteq \text{BAS}$
- An **attack suite** is a set of attacks: $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^{\text{BAS}}$
- A **structure function** tells if an attack succeeds:

$$f_T(v, A) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{OR} \text{ and } \exists u \in \text{ch}(v). f_T(u, A) = \top, \\ \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{AND} \text{ and } \forall u \in \text{ch}(v). f_T(u, A) = \top, \\ \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{BAS} \text{ and } v \in A, \\ \perp & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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- An **attack suite** is a set of attacks: $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^{\text{BAS}}$
- A **structure function** tells if an attack succeeds:


$$f_T(v, A) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{OR} \text{ and } \exists u \in \text{ch}(v). f_T(u, A) = \top, \\ \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{AND} \text{ and } \forall u \in \text{ch}(v). f_T(u, A) = \top, \\ \top & \text{if } t(v) = \text{BAS} \text{ and } v \in A, \\ \perp & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- The **semantics of T** is the suite of all minimal successful attacks:


$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{A \subseteq \text{BAS} \mid f_T(A) \wedge A \text{ is minimal}\}$$

Theorem: computing $\llbracket T \rrbracket$ is an **NP-complete** problem

Static AT metrics




- An **attribute domain** is a tuple $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$ where:
 - $\nabla: V^2 \rightarrow V$ is a **disjunctive** operator
 - $\Delta: V^2 \rightarrow V$ is a **conjunctive** operator } associative & commutative




$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{\{b\}, \{a, c\}\}$$

Static AT metrics




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METRIC	V	∇	Δ
min cost	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	+
min time	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	+
min skill	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	max
max challenge	\mathbb{N}_∞	max	max
max damage	\mathbb{N}_∞	max	+
discrete prob.	$[0, 1]_{\mathbb{Q}}$	max	*
continu. prob. $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]_{\mathbb{Q}}$	$\mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]_{\mathbb{Q}}$	max	*




$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{\{b\}, \{a, c\}\}$$

Static AT metrics



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 - $\nabla: V^2 \rightarrow V$ is a **disjunctive** operator
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 } associative & commutative
- The **metric for a static AT** T , attribution α , and domain D is:


$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \underbrace{\bigtriangledown_{A \in [T]}}_{\check{\alpha}} \underbrace{\bigtriangleup_{a \in A}}_{\hat{\alpha}} \alpha(a)$$



$$[T] = \{\{b\}, \{a, c\}\}$$


METRIC	V	∇	Δ
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Static AT metrics



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$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \underbrace{\bigtriangledown_{A \in \llbracket T \rrbracket}}_{\check{\alpha}} \underbrace{\bigtriangleup_{a \in A}}_{\hat{\alpha}} \alpha(a)$$



$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{ \{b\}, \{a, c\} \}$$


$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta) = (\mathbb{N}, \min, +)$$

$$\begin{matrix} \downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \\ \{3, 1, 4\} & & \end{matrix} = \alpha = V$$

min cost


METRIC	V	∇	Δ
min cost	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	+
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min skill	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	max
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Static AT metrics



- An **attribute domain** is a tuple $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$ where:
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- The **metric for a static AT** T , attribution α , and domain D is:


$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \underbrace{\bigtriangledown_{A \in [T]}}_{\check{\alpha}} \underbrace{\bigtriangleup_{a \in A}}_{\hat{\alpha}} \alpha(a)$$



$$\begin{aligned} \check{\alpha}(T) &= \bigtriangledown_{A \in [T]} \bigtriangleup_{a \in A} \alpha(a) \\ &= (\alpha(b)) \nabla (\alpha(a) \Delta \alpha(c)) \\ &= (1) \min (3 + 4) \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

METRIC	V	∇	Δ
min cost	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	+
min time	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	+
min skill	\mathbb{N}_∞	min	max
max challenge	\mathbb{N}_∞	max	max
max damage	\mathbb{N}_∞	max	+
discrete prob.	$[0, 1]_{\mathbb{Q}}$	max	*
continu. prob.	$\mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]_{\mathbb{Q}}$	max	*

① T is a static tree




- Domain $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$ is a **semiring** if Δ distributes over ∇

S. Mauw & M. Oostdijk: “*Foundations of Attack Trees.*” ICISC 2006. DOI: [10.1007/11734727_17](https://doi.org/10.1007/11734727_17)

① T is a static tree

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① T is a static tree


- Domain $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$ is a **semiring** if Δ distributes over ∇

BU_{SAT} algorithm, linear in T

Input: S-tree $T = (N, t, ch)$,
node $v \in N$,
attribution α ,
semiring attribute domain
 $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$.

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```
if  $t(v) = \text{OR}$  then
  | return  $\nabla_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else if  $t(v) = \text{AND}$  then
  | return  $\Delta_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else //  $t(v) = \text{BAS}$ 
  | return  $\alpha(v)$ 
```



S. Mauw & M. Oostdijk: "Foundations of Attack Trees." ICISC 2006. DOI: [10.1007/11734727_17](https://doi.org/10.1007/11734727_17)

① T is a static tree


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

```
if  $t(v) = \text{OR}$  then
  | return  $\nabla_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else if  $t(v) = \text{AND}$  then
  | return  $\Delta_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else //  $t(v) = \text{BAS}$ 
  | return  $\alpha(v)$ 
```



Theorem. Let T be a static AT with tree structure, α an attribution on V , and $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta)$ a semiring attribute domain.

Then $\check{\alpha}(T) = \text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T, R_T, \alpha, D)$.



② T is a static DAG



$$\check{\alpha}(T) = 1 \quad \{ 3, 1, 4 \}$$

$$\text{BU}_{\text{SAT}}(T) = (3 \min 1) + (1 \min 4) = 2$$

② T is a static DAG




$$\check{\alpha}(T) = 1 \quad \{3, 1, 4\}$$

$$\text{BU}_{\text{AT}}(T) = (3 \min 1) + (1 \min 4) = 2$$

② T is a static DAG

- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (\underbrace{W, Lab}_{BAS_T \cup \{1,0\}}, \underbrace{Low, High}_{f_T})$



$$\check{\alpha}(T) = 1 \quad \{3, 1, 4\}$$


$$BU_{\text{min}}(T) = (3 \min 1) + (1 \min 4) = 2$$

② T is a static DAG


- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

$BAS_T \cup \{1, 0\}$

f_T



$b < a < c$



② T is a static DAG

- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T


Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
 attribution α ,
 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.


```

if Lab(w) = 0 then
  | return  $1_\nabla$ 
else if Lab(w) = 1 then
  | return  $1_\Delta$ 
else // either do Lab(w) = v ∈ BAS, or not
  | return (  $\alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots$ 
  |    $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  |    $\nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  
```


$$B_T = (\underbrace{W}_{BAS_T \cup \{1, 0\}}, \underbrace{Lab}_{f_T}, Low, High)$$



$b < a < c$



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- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

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

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```

if Lab(w) = 0 then
  | return 1∇
else if Lab(w) = 1 then
  | return 1Δ
else // either do Lab(w) = v ∈ BAS, or not
  | return ( α(Lab(w)) Δ ...
  | ... BDDSAT(BT, High(w), α, D*) )
  | ∇ BDDSAT(BT, Low(w), α, D*)
    
```

do attack $Lab(w) = v \in BAS$

$$B_{AS_T} \cup \{1, 0\} \quad f_T$$



② T is a static DAG

- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
 attribution α ,
 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.



Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```


if Lab(w) = 0 then
  | return 1∇
else if Lab(w) = 1 then
  | return 1Δ
else // either do Lab(w) = v ∈ BAS, or not
  | return ( α(Lab(w)) Δ ...
  |   ... BDDSAT(BT, High(w), α, D*)
  |   ∇ BDDSAT(BT, Low(w), α, D*)
  
```

do not attack v

$$B_T = (\underbrace{W}_{BAS_T \cup \{1, 0\}}, \underbrace{Lab}_{f_T}, Low, High)$$



② T is a static DAG



- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
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Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```


if Lab(w) = 0 then
  | return 1 $\nabla$ 
else if Lab(w) = 1 then
  | return 1 $\Delta$ 
    
```

failure/success


```

else // either do Lab(w) = v \in BAS, or not
  return ( \alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots
    \dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)
    \nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)
    
```

$$B_T = (\underbrace{W}_{BAS_T \cup \{1,0\}}, \underbrace{Lab}_{f_T}, Low, High)$$



$b < a < c$



② T is a static DAG

- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$

BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
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 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

if $Lab(w) = 0$ **then**



 | **return** 1_∇

else if $Lab(w) = 1$ **then**

 | **return** 1_Δ

else // either do $Lab(w) = v \in BAS$, or not

 | **return** $(\alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots$
 $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$)
 | $\nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)$



$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta) = (\text{cost}, \min, +, \infty, 0)$$

$$BDD_{SAT}(w_b) =$$

② T is a static DAG

- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$


BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
 attribution α ,
 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.


Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```

if  $Lab(w) = 0$  then
  | return  $1_\nabla$ 
else if  $Lab(w) = 1$  then
  | return  $1_\Delta$ 
else // either do  $Lab(w) = v \in BAS$ , or not
  | return  $(\alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots$ 
  |    $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$ )
  |  $\nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  
```




$$b < a < c$$



$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta) = (\text{cost}, \min, +, \infty, 0)$$

$$BDD_{SAT}(w_b) = (1 + 0) \min BDD_{SAT}(w_a)$$

② T is a static DAG



- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$



BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
 attribution α ,
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Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```


if  $Lab(w) = 0$  then
  | return  $1_\nabla$ 
else if  $Lab(w) = 1$  then
  | return  $1_\Delta$ 
else // either do  $Lab(w) = v \in BAS$ , or not
  | return  $(\alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots$ 
  |    $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$ )
  |  $\nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  
```



$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta) = (\text{cost}, \min, +, \infty, 0)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 BDD_{SAT}(w_b) &= (1 + 0) \min BDD_{SAT}(w_a) \\
 &= (1) \min ((3 + BDD_{SAT}(w_c)) \min \infty)
 \end{aligned}$$

② T is a static DAG



- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$



BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
 node $w \in W$,
 attribution α ,
 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```


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  |    $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$ )
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```



$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta) = (\text{cost}, \min, +, \infty, 0)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 BDD_{SAT}(w_b) &= (1 + 0) \min BDD_{SAT}(w_a) \\
 &= (1) \min ((3 + BDD_{SAT}(w_c)) \min \infty) \\
 &= (1) \min (3 + ((4 + 0) \min \infty)) = 1
 \end{aligned}$$

② T is a static DAG



- Binary Decision Diagram (**BDD**) $B_T = (W, Lab, Low, High)$


BDD_{SAT} algorithm, linear in B_T

Input: BDD $B_T = (W, Low, High, Lab)$,
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 attribution α ,
 semiring attribute domain
 $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$.


Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```

if  $Lab(w) = 0$  then
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else // either do  $Lab(w) = v \in BAS$ , or not
  | return  $(\alpha(Lab(w)) \Delta \dots$ 
  |    $\dots BDD_{SAT}(B_T, High(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  |    $\nabla BDD_{SAT}(B_T, Low(w), \alpha, D_*)$ 
  |
  
```



$b < a < c$





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
Theorem. Let T be a static AT, B_T its BDD encoding, α an attribution on V , and $D_* = (V, \nabla, \Delta, 1_\nabla, 1_\Delta)$ a semiring attr. dom. with neutral elements resp. for ∇ and Δ .

Then $\check{\alpha}(T) = BDD_{SAT}(B_T, R_B, \alpha, D_*)$.


Dynamic AT semantics (order in attacks)




Dynamic AT semantics (order in attacks)




- An **attack** is a partially ordered set: $\langle A, \prec \rangle$
 - $a \prec b$ iff $a \in \text{BAS}$ must finish before b begins





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
$$a \prec b \wedge b \prec a$$




$$a \prec b \prec c$$

- The **ordering graph** $G_T = (\text{BAS}_T, \rightarrow)$ of a dynamic AT has the edge $a \rightarrow b$ iff $\exists \text{SAND}(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ s.t. $a \in \text{BAS}(v_i) \wedge b \in \text{BAS}(v_{i+1})$
- A dynamic AT is **well-formed** if its ordering graph is acyclic


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
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
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
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
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
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- Attacks $\langle A, \prec \rangle$ defined for well-formed ATs only
 - \prec is a restriction (to $A \subseteq \text{BAS}$) of the edges of G_T




Dynamic AT semantics (order in attacks)




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- A dynamic AT is **well-formed** if its ordering graph is acyclic
- Attacks $\langle A, \prec \rangle$ defined for well-formed ATs only
 - \prec is a restriction (to $A \subseteq \text{BAS}$) of the edges of G_T
- The **semantics of T** is the suite of all minimal successful attacks
 - $\langle A, \prec \rangle$ is minimal iff $A \subseteq \text{BAS}$ and $\prec \subseteq \text{BAS}^2$ are minimal



Dynamic AT metrics




- A **dynamic attribute domain** is a tuple $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright)$
 - $\triangleright: V^2 \rightarrow V$ is a **sequential** operator
For the ordered steps. Also associative & commutative.



$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{ \langle \{ff, w\}, \emptyset \rangle, \langle \{w, cc\}, \{w \prec cc\} \rangle \}$$

Dynamic AT metrics




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
$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \underbrace{\bigtriangledown}_{\check{\alpha}} \underbrace{\bigtriangle}_{\hat{\alpha}} \underbrace{\triangleright}_{\bar{\alpha}} \alpha(a)$$

$\langle A, \prec \rangle \in \llbracket T \rrbracket$ $C \in H_A^{\check{\alpha}}$ $a \in C$



$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{ \langle \{ff, w\}, \emptyset \rangle, \langle \{w, cc\}, \{w \prec cc\} \rangle \}$$

Dynamic AT metrics




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$\langle A, \prec \rangle \in \llbracket T \rrbracket$ $C \in H_A^\prec$ $a \in C$




$$\llbracket T \rrbracket = \{ \langle \{ff, w\}, \emptyset \rangle, \langle \{w, cc\}, \{w \prec cc\} \rangle \}$$

$$D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright) = (\mathbb{N}, \min, \max, +)$$

min time

Dynamic AT metrics




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For the ordered steps. Also associative & commutative.

- The **metric for a dynamic AT** T , attribution α , and domain D is:

$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \underbrace{\bigtriangledown}_{\check{\alpha}} \underbrace{\bigtriangleup}_{\hat{\alpha}} \underbrace{\triangleright}_{\bar{\alpha}} \alpha(a)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \check{\alpha}(T) &= \bigtriangledown_{\langle A, \prec \rangle \in [T]} \bigtriangleup_{C \in H_A^\prec} \triangleright_{a \in C} \alpha(a) \\ &= (\alpha(ff) \Delta \alpha(w)) \nabla (\alpha(w) \triangleright \alpha(cc)) \\ &= (3 \max 15) \min (15 + 1) \\ &= 15 \end{aligned}$$




$$[T] = \{ \langle \{ff, w\}, \emptyset \rangle, \langle \{w, cc\}, \{w \prec cc\} \rangle \}$$

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
min time

③ T is a dynamic tree



- $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright)$ is a **semiring** if Δ distributes over ∇ , and \triangleright over ∇ and Δ

③ T is a dynamic tree



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
BU_{DAT} algorithm, linear in T

Input: S-tree $T = (N, t, ch)$,
node $v \in N$,
attribution α ,
semiring dynamic attr. dom.
 $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright)$.

Output: Metric value $\check{\alpha}(T) \in V$.

```
if  $t(v) = \text{OR}$  then
| return  $\nabla_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{DAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else if  $t(v) = \text{AND}$  then
| return  $\Delta_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{DAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else if  $t(v) = \text{SAND}$  then
| return  $\triangleright_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{DAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else //  $t(v) = \text{BAS}$ 
| return  $\alpha(v)$ 
```

③ T is a dynamic tree




- $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright)$ is a **semiring** if Δ distributes over ∇ , and \triangleright over ∇ and Δ

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else if  $t(v) = \text{SAND}$  then
| return  $\triangleright_{u \in ch(v)} \text{BU}_{\text{DAT}}(T, u, \alpha, D)$ 
else //  $t(v) = \text{BAS}$ 
| return  $\alpha(v)$ 
```



③ T is a dynamic tree


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

```
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```





Theorem. Let T be a dynamic AT with tree structure, α an attribution on V , and $D = (V, \nabla, \Delta, \triangleright)$ a semiring dyn. attr. dom.

Then $\check{\alpha}(T) = \text{BU}_{\text{DAT}}(T, R_T, \alpha, D)$.

④ T is a dynamic DAG





④ T is a dynamic DAG



~~Bottom-Up~~

~~BDD~~

④ T is a dynamic DAG





~~Bottom-Up~~

~~BDD~~

$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \bigvee_{\langle A, \prec \rangle \in \llbracket T \rrbracket} \bigtriangleup_{C \in H_A^{\prec}} \bigtriangleright_{a \in C} \alpha(a)$$

$\llbracket T \rrbracket$ can be computed from the ordering graph G_T and the semantics of the static transform T'

④ T is a dynamic DAG



Bottom-Up

BDD

$$\check{\alpha}(T) = \bigvee_{\langle A, \prec \rangle \in \llbracket T \rrbracket} \bigtriangleup_{C \in H_A^{\prec}} \bigtriangleright_{a \in C} \alpha(a)$$

$\llbracket T \rrbracket$ can be computed from the ordering graph G_T and the semantics of the static transform T'


Else: extend **sequential BDDs** for attack metrics?

- An S-BDD considers all combinations of descendants of SAND gates
- Combinatorial explosion on top of exponential explosion :'(

H. Yu & X. Wu: "A method for transformation from dynamic fault tree to binary decision diagram." (2020) Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability.

DOI: [10.1177/1748006X20974187](https://doi.org/10.1177/1748006X20974187)


Summary of contributions



	Static	Dynamic
Tree	① S-tree	③ D-tree
DAG	② S-DAG	④ D-DAG

	①	②	③	④
Metric	Static tree	Static DAG	Dynamic tree	Dynamic DAG
min cost	BU [14, 15, 16]	MTBDD [17] \mathcal{C} -BU [18]	BU [4]	PTA [8]
min time	BU [14, 19]	Petri nets [12]	APH [9] BU [4]	PTA [8]
min skill	BU [14, 20]	\mathcal{C} -BU [18]	BU [4]	—
max probability	BU [6, 19]	BDD [21] DPLL [7]	APH [9]	I/O-IMC [5]
Any of the above	Algo. 1: BU _{SAT}	Algo. 2: BDD _{DAG}	Algo. 5: BU _{DAT}	OPEN PROBLEM
k-top metrics	BU-projection [14]	Algo. 3: BDD shortest_paths	OPEN PROBLEM	OPEN PROBLEM

Summary of contributions




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- **NP-hard**: compute minimal successful attack in static ATs is NP-hard
- **BDD_{DAG}**: BDD algorithm to compute metrics for static-DAG ATs
- **BDD_{shortest-path}**: algorithm to compute *k*-top best attacks

Static

Summary of contributions



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- **NP-hard**: compute minimal successful attack in static ATs is NP-hard
- **BDD_{DAG}**: BDD algorithm to compute metrics for static-DAG ATs
- **BDD_{shortest-path}**: algorithm to compute *k*-top best attacks
- **Poset semantics** (and well-formedness) for dynamic ATs
- **BU_{DAT}**: Bottom-Up algorithm to compute metrics for dynamic-tree ATs
- Directions to analyse dynamic-DAG ATs (open problem)

Dyn.

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Efficient Algorithms for Quantitative Attack Tree Analysis

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