



CISPA


HELMHOLTZ CENTER FOR
INFORMATION SECURITY

Verifying Accountability for Unbounded Sets of Participants

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- Accountability notion of Künneman et. al. (2019)
- Based on sufficient causation


- **Accountability for φ**
 - Meta property of a protocol
 - Allows identifying all parties causing a violation of φ



When is a party's behavior the cause of a violation?


Accountability by Causation




⇒ verdict = {{  }}



⇒ verdict = {{  ,  }}



Actual Situation




Counterfactual Situation



Need relation between actual and counterfactual world!

- How can accountability be verified?



$\Rightarrow \text{verdict}(t)$ provides accountability for φ

- Case distinction on different verdicts

$$verdict(t) := \begin{cases} V_1 & \text{if } \omega_1(t) \\ \vdots & \\ V_n & \text{if } \omega_n(t) \end{cases}$$

- Cases are **exhaustive** and **exclusive**
- **Problems**
 1. Finite number of verdicts
 2. Verdicts must be stated explicitly

⇒ Only a bounded number of parties are supported

- **Case tests:** Trace properties with free variables

$$\tau_1 := \exists data, i. \text{LeakEmployee}(e, data)@i$$


$$\tau_2 := \exists data, i. \text{LeakAdminHacker}(a, h, data)@i$$

- **Verdict function:** Union over instantiated case tests

Free variables

$$\text{verdict}(t) := \bigcup_{\tau \in \text{tests}} \{fv(\tau)\rho \mid \exists \rho. t \models \tau\rho\}$$


- Example




$$\text{verdict}(t) = \{ \{E_1\}, \{A, H\}, \{E_2\} \}$$


Challenge: Counterfactual Relation

Actual Trace



Counterfactual Traces





```
test evidence:  
  "Ex #i. Blame(m)@i"  
  
lemma missing:  
  evidence accounts for  
  "All sid s ms #i. Send(<sid, s>, ms)@i  
    ==> Ex m #j. Post(<sid, m>, '0', ms)@j"
```

```
lemma missing_evidence_suff: ...  
/* ... */  
lemma missing_evidence_single: ...
```

missing_evidence_suff: verified (16 steps)

missing_verif_empty: falsified - found trace (16 steps)



- 8 case studies (4 from prior work, 4 new)
- Prior work

	Our proposal		[21]	
WhoDunit (fixed)	✓ 7	52 s	✓ (r_c)	8 24 s
			✓ (r_w)	7 11 s
Certificate Transparency (extended)	✓ 27	17 s	✓	31 21 s
OCSP Stapling (trusted resp.)	✓ 7	1 s	✓	7 515 s
OCSP Stapling (untrusted resp.)	✗ 7	1 s	✗	7 75 s

- New case studies

Our proposal	1 role	2 roles	3 roles	4 roles	5 roles
Basic DMN (duplicate ciphertexts)	—	—	✓ 13 26 s	—	—
DMN + message tracing (first)	✓ 7 8 s	✓ 7 124 s	✓ 7 1373 s	✓ 7 14 178 s	✓ 7 134 160 s
DMN + message tracing (all)	✓ 7 6 s	✗ 7 12 s	✗ 7 22 s	✗ 7 100 s	✗ 7 355 s
MixVote (unbounded)	✓ 14 6 s	—	—	—	—
[21]	1 party	2 parties	3 parties	4 parties	5 parties
DMN + message tracing (first)	✓ 7 7 s	✓ 17 133 s	✓ 46 2146 s	✓ 149 23 827 s	—* 544 —
DMN + message tracing (all)	✓ 7 4 s	✗ 17 23 s	✗ 46 115 s	✗ 149 548 s	✗ 544 2922 s
MixVote (unbounded)**	✓ 14 5 s	✓ 34 58 s	✓ 92 2721 s	—* 298 —	—* 1112 —

* No verification results due to memory exhaustion. ** Each party acts in the same role, that of the server.

- Automated verification of accountability supporting an unbounded number of participants
 - Necessary for analyzing real-world protocols
- Case tests as the key concept
 - Flexible definition of verdict functions
 - Improved readability
- Implemented in Tamarin (github.com/kevinmorio/tamarin-prover)
- Up to 5x faster than the previous approach
- Less effort to formulate accountability lemmas