

# Privacy in a Data-Driven World

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<https://roxanageambasu.github.io/>

# Example: Gmail Ads

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## email **subject** & text

E1	<b>Vacation</b> I'm going on vacation to travel.
E2	<b>Homosexual</b> Gay, lesbian, homosexual.
E3	<b>Pregnant</b> I'm pregnant. I'm having a baby.
E4	<b>Unemployed</b> I'm unemployed.
E5	<b>Ford</b> I want to buy a car, maybe a Ford.

## ad **title**, url & text

<b>Ralph Lauren Online Shop</b> <u><a href="http://www.ralphlauren.com">www.ralphlauren.com</a></u> The official Site for Ralph Lauren Apparel, Accessories & More	Ad1
<b>Cedars Hotel Loughborough</b> <u><a href="http://www.thecedarshotel.com">www.thecedarshotel.com</a></u> 36 Bedrooms, Restaurant, Bar Free WiFi, Parking, Best Rates	Ad2

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


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
Ad1

Ad2


# Example: Gmail Ads



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# Example: Gmail Ads



# It's not just Gmail...

## Did you know?

- Data brokers can tell when you're sick, tired and depressed -- and sell this information. [CNN '14]
- Google Apps for Ed used institutional emails to target ads in personal accounts. [SafeGov'14]
- Credit companies are looking into using Facebook data to decide loans. [CNN'13]





# My research

1. Build **transparency tools** that increase users' awareness and society's oversight over how apps use personal data:
  - **Sunlight**: reveals the causes of targeting [CCS'15].
  - **XRay**: reveals targeting through correlation [USENIX Sec'14].
  - **Pebbles**: reveals how mobile apps manage persistent data [OSDI'14].

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
## my students:



Vaggelis Atlidakis



Mathias Lecuyer



Riley Spahn

---

## some of my collaborators:



Augustin Chaintreau  
(Columbia)



Daniel Hsu  
(Columbia)



Jean-Pierre Hubaux  
(EPFL)



Ari Juels  
(Cornell Tech)

# Sunlight:

transparency for the data-driven web.

[CCS 2015]

# Sunlight

Generic and broadly applicable system that detects personal data use for **targeting and personalization**.

Reveals which data (e.g., emails) triggers which outputs (e.g., ads).


- Key idea: **correlate inputs with outputs** based on observations from profiles with differentiated inputs.

Sunlight is **precise, scalable**, and **works with many services**.


We tested it for Gmail ads, ads on arbitrary websites, recommendations on Amazon & YouTube, prices in travel websites.



# Example




# Example




# Example


main account




# Example



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


# Example




data collection: service-specific,  
with browser automation

targeting analysis:  
service-agnostic, with **Sunlight**



# Transparency solutions





# Sunlight talk

Overview

Design

Evaluation

Use cases

# Design goals

## Generic and broadly applicable targeting detection

We assume that a small set of inputs is used to produce each output. Our goal is to discover the *correct* input combination.


## Precise and justifiable targeting predictions

Targeting predictions must be statistically justified. Our goal is to detect as many *true* predictions as possible.

## Scalable in number of inputs and outputs

Detect targeting of many outputs on many inputs w/ limited resources.

# The scalability challenge



- To detect targeting on combinations of the inputs, will we need shadow profiles for all combinations???


# Scalable targeting detection

- **Theorem:** *Under sparsity assumptions, for any  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists an algorithm that requires  $C \times \log(N)$  accounts to correctly identify the inputs of a targeted output with probability  $(1 - \varepsilon)$ .  $N$  is the number of inputs.*
- Key insight: rely on **sparsity properties** (like compressed sensing).
- We incorporate **several sparse detection algorithms**:
  - **Set intersection** -- simple, not robust
  - **Sparse regressions (Lasso)** -- well established, robust


# Justifiable targeting predictions

- Sparse algorithms only guarantee asymptotic correctness of the targeting predictions.
- We need **correctness assessment** for each targeting prediction.
- Solution: **hypothesis testing**.
  - Provides quantification of statistical significance of each targeting association (a p-value).
  - p-value gives knob for precision/recall tradeoff.


# Architecture



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


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





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
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
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# What we get in the end

If during data collection we randomly assign our inputs independently of any other variable, Sunlight's associations will have **a causal interpretation** (not just correlation).

However, **Sunlight cannot explain how this targeting happens.**

E.g.: What player in the ecosystem is responsible? Is it a human intervention or an algorithmic decision?

# Sunlight talk

Overview

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Use cases

# Datasets

<b>Workload</b>	<b>Profiles</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>Outputs</b>
Gmail (one day)	119	327	4099
Website	200	84	4867
Website-large	798	263	19808
YouTube	45	64	308
Amazon	51	61	2593



# Targeting prediction precision

We developed two methodologies:

1. **Manual assessments** of how “believable” are our low-p-value predictions ( $<0.05$ ).


We observed 100% precision for smaller experiments and **95%-96% precision** for larger experiments. Despite potential for confirmation bias, this is in line with expectation at  $p\text{-value} < 0.05$ .

2. Assess the **quality of targeting predictions**.


If we conclude that  $E3 \rightarrow Ad1$ , we should be able to use E3's presence in a shadow account to accurately guess whether Ad1 appears in that account.

# Quality of targeting predictions

Y: Proportion of ad appearances that were correctly guessed to be present in a shadow account.



# Quality of targeting predictions



Y: Proportion of success when guessing if an ad will be present in a shadow account.

# Targeting prediction recall

We found recall **impossible** to quantify manually.


Too many outputs, too many input possibilities, too error prone.

We developed this methodology:


Inspected ads for which Sunlight had some evidence they were being targeted, but for which correction spoiled their p-values.

This methodology revealed a **precision-recall tradeoff at scale** due to correction.

# Precision/recall tradeoff




p-value CDF **before** correction




p-value CDF **after** correction

# Precision/recall tradeoff




p-value CDF **before** correction




p-value CDF **after** correction

# Precision/recall tradeoff



p-value CDF **before** correction



p-value CDF **after** correction

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Design


Evaluation

**Use cases**



# Sunlight-based tools

auditor (e.g., FTC, investigative journalists)



# GmailAdObservatory

- Service to **study targeting of Gmail ads** on users' emails.
  - Meant for researchers and journalists.
- How it works:
  - Researcher supplies a set of emails.
  - GmailAdObservatory uses a set of Gmail accounts to send emails to a separate set of Gmail accounts (the shadows).
  - It then collects ads periodically.
  - Uses Sunlight to detect targeting for each collected ad.

# Gmail Targeting Study

- We studied ad targeting in Gmail at pretty large scale.
  - 20K unique ads collected from an inbox with 300 single-keyword emails on various “sensitive” topics.
- Found contradictions to Google’s own privacy statement.

## Privacy, Transparency and Choice

[...]

We will also not target ads based on sensitive information, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, health, or sensitive financial categories.

-- <http://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603>

“We will also not target ads based on sensitive information, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, **health**, or sensitive financial categories.”

	email <b>subject</b> & text	ads <b>Title</b> , <b>url</b> & text	Results
General Health	<b>Affordable</b> affordable care [...] (OR) ..... <b>Nursing</b> nursing home [...]	<b>Illinois Senior Living</b> <a href="http://www.cottagesofnewlenox.com">www.cottagesofnewlenox.com</a> Assisted Living for Seniors in New Lenox [...]	p-value = 0.03 103 impressions in 36 profiles 28% in context
	<b>Alzheimer</b> Alzheimer Alzheimer	<b>1/3 of Seniors 65+ Fall</b> <a href="http://jacuzzi-walk-in-tubs.com/Safety">jacuzzi-walk-in-tubs.com/Safety</a> Help Eliminate the Fear of Falling in the Bathroom [...]	p-value = 0.01 21 impressions in 8 profiles 100% in context
	<b>Depressed</b> depression (OR) ..... <b>Anxious</b> anxious anxiety	<b>Is He A Cheater?</b> <a href="http://spokeo.com/Cheating-Spouse-Search">spokeo.com/Cheating-Spouse-Search</a> Enter His Email Address. Find Pics & Profiles From 70+ Social Networks.	p-value = 0.03 1179 impressions in 52 profiles 20% in context
	<b>Cancer advice</b> How did you cope with cancer in your family? What an awful disease!	<b>The Business of Wellness</b> <a href="http://healthmediagroup.blogspot.com">healthmediagroup.blogspot.com</a> What my doctor can learn from my Shoe Shine Man [...]	p-value = 0.04 380 impressions in 28 profiles 91% in context

“We will also not target ads based on sensitive information, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, health, or **sensitive financial categories.**”

	email <b>subject</b> & <b>text</b>	ads <b>Title</b> , <b>url</b> & text	<b>Results</b>
<b>Sensitive Financial</b>	<b>Unemployed</b> lazy unemployed	<b>Easy Auto Financing</b> <a href="http://www.midsouthautoloans.com">www.midsouthautoloans.com</a> Need a quick car loan? We work with credit issues	p-value = 0.006 161 impressions in 24 profiles 8% in context
	<b>Payday</b> payday loan	<b>Fast Cash Loan Online.</b> <a href="http://www.checkintocash.com">www.checkintocash.com</a> Apply Now. Takes Only 5 Minutes. It's as Easy as 1,2,3.	p-value = 0.007 198 impressions in 10 profiles 6% in context

Notice the extremely low in-context impressions -- the most obscure form of targeting.



# FairTest:

fairness testing toolkit for data-driven apps.

[Euro S&P 2017]

# Unfair Associations

- Personal data + complex algos can lead to **unintended and discriminatory consequences**.
- Such consequences are **bugs**, for which developers should actively test and debug as they do for functionality, performance, reliability bugs.

## THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

In what appears to be an **unintended side effect of** Staples' pricing methods—areas that tended to see the discounted prices had a higher average income than areas that tended to see higher prices.


c|net Search CNET Q Reviews News

**Google apologizes for algorithm mistakenly calling black people 'gorillas'**



# FairTest

- Testing suite for **unintended associations** in data-driven apps.
  - Detects associations between user attributes (race, gender, age) and service outputs (prices, labels).
- Offers **debugging**, not just detection, capabilities.



# Results

- We checked **five data-driven apps** for unexplained associations, including:
  - Movie recommender.
  - Image labeling system (OverFeat).
  - Predictive healthcare application, the winner of a 2012 Heritage Health Competition.
- We found unexpected associations **in all apps**, some real bugs.
  - Example: the **predictive health app** provides good error overall (15%) but its error disproportionately affects elderly patients, where it can be as high as 45%.


# My vision for privacy

## Critical problem

**Erosion of privacy:** users share too much, services collect and use their information with almost no accountability.

## My vision

Forge a new world where users are **privacy aware** and services more **accountable** and **privacy-preserving** by design.



# Related visions

- Two other groups aim to build **transparency infrastructures**:
  - CMU's Anupam Datta's group.
  - Princeton's Arvind Narayanan and Ed Felten's group.
  - We uniquely focus on **both scalability and broad applicability**.
- History:
  - 2014: We published the first paper on this topic: **XRay** (USENIX Security). Offers good scalability but no statistical justification.
  - 2015: Anupam published **AdFisher** (PETS). Offers statistical justification but isn't built to scale with more than one input.
  - 2015: We published **Sunlight** (CCS). Builds on XRay and AdFisher but offers both scale and statistical justification.