



On the (Im)Practicality of Adversarial Perturbation for Image Privacy



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Introduction

Automated face recognition models can be used for tracking activities and relationships of image sharing platform users [PoPETS2015].

Comparing indexed with unindexed images




Figure 1. Facial-recognition models could endanger our privacy [E&T2020].

Adversarial Perturbation As Image Privacy Defense

- Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are susceptible to adversarial perturbation
- Previously proposed adversarial perturbation-based approaches are not practical for real world applications

Practical Requirements:

Black-box Attack	Users do not know about target CNNs
Low Computational Cost	Users only have a few personal images (family and friends) and limited computational resources
Low Storage Cost	Users do not want to keep a perturbation per image (storage burden)
Recoverability	Users want to recover the original images
Recognizability	Users want to have recognizable images
Compatibility	The proposed approach must be practical on all platforms

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Proposed Schemes

Universal Ensemble Perturbation (UEP):

- Uses small CNNs trained only on 10 classes \Rightarrow Low computational cost
- Trains CNNs locally \Rightarrow Black-box scheme
- Learns a universal transferable perturbation \Rightarrow Low storage cost
- Adds perturbation to arc-tangent hyperbolic space of image \Rightarrow Low loss recovery

$$x_{i,perturbed} = \frac{1}{2}(\tanh(\arctanh(2 \times (x_i - 0.5)) + \beta \times \delta)) + 0.5$$

K-Randomized Transparent Image Overlay (k-RTIO):

- Semantic-based adversarial perturbation \Rightarrow Low computational cost
- Uses a secret key and ID of the source image to generate a unique overlay images \Rightarrow Low storage cost
- Easy to recover \Rightarrow Reversibility
- No CNNs required for generating perturbations \Rightarrow Black-box scheme




Figure 2. UEP Scheme.




Figure 3. k-RTIO Scheme.

Results

- Dataset: 1000 images sampled from FaceScrub celebrities' face dataset
- Face detection and recognition models
 - DeepFace [CVPR2014]
 - Clarifai.com
 - Google Vision API




Figure 4. Accuracy of face recognition and detection on perturbed images by UEP




Figure 5. Accuracy of clarifai.com face recognition and detection on perturbed images by k-RTIO

Potential Attacks Against UEP & k-RTIO

- UEP is vulnerable to estimation and removal perturbation method, since it uses a single perturbation for several images.




Figure 6. Estimation and removal perturbation method can obtain recognizable images for classifiers

- k-RTIO is robust to filtering methods including estimation and removal perturbation method, since it generates a unique perturbation per image
- The CNNs trained over k-RTIO images can improve their accuracy. But, training robust CNNs is computationally expensive and does not guarantee robustness against all other type of adversarial examples

Conclusions

- Our k-Randomized Transparent Image Overlays can fool well-known face recognition models at least for 85% of the perturbed images
- Our Universal Ensemble Perturbation can fool well-known face recognition models at least for 90% of the perturbed images for $\beta = 4$
- Both UEP and k-RTIO satisfy practical requirements

Future Directions

- Evaluating users/humans' ability of recognizing k-RTIO perturbed faces for specific α , k and block-size values.
- Generating synthetic overlay images instead of using a fixed set of overlay images
- Extending differential-privacy based perturbation approaches which provide strong guarantees for image privacy

References

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