Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential Privacy

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Code: <u>https://github.com/columbia/pixeldp</u> Contact: mathias@cs.columbia.edu

Deep Learning


- Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) deliver remarkable performance on many tasks.
- DNNs are increasingly deployed, including in attack-prone contexts:


The New York Times

Taylor Swift Said to Use Facial Recognition to Identify Stalkers

By Sopan Deb, Natasha Singer - Dec. 13, 2018


Example






Example


But DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks.







Example

But DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks.







Best-effort approaches

1. Evaluate accuracy under attack:

- Launch an attack on examples in a test set.
- Compute accuracy on the attacked examples.
- 2. Improve accuracy under attack:
 - Many approaches: e.g. train on adversarial examples.

(e.g Goodfellow+ '15; Papernot+ '16; Buckman+ '18; Guo+ '18)

Problem: both steps are attack specific, leading to an arms race that attackers are winning.

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(e.g Carlini-Wagner '17; Athalye+ '18)
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Key questions

- Guaranteed accuracy: what is my minimum accuracy under any attack?
- Prediction robustness: given a prediction can any attack change it?

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- A few recent approaches with provable guarantees. (e.g. Wong-Kolter '18; Raghunathan+ '18; Wang+ '18)
- Poor scalability in terms of:
 - Input dimension (e.g. number of pixels).
 - DNN size.
 - Size of training data.

Key questions

- Guaranteed accuracy: what is my minimum accuracy under any attack?
- Prediction robustness: given a prediction can any attack change it?

- My defense PixelDP gives answers for norm bounded attacks.
- Key idea: novel use of differential privacy theory at prediction time.
- The most scalable approach: first provable guarantees for large models on ImageNet!


PixeIDP outline

Motivation


Design

Evaluation

• Problem: small input perturbations create large score changes.



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- Idea: design a DNN with bounded maximum score changes (leveraging Differential Privacy theory).



Differential Privacy


- Differential Privacy (DP): technique to randomize a computation over a database, such that changing one data point can only lead to bounded changes in the distribution over possible outputs.
- For (ε, δ) -DP randomized computation A_f :


$$P(A_f(d) \in S) \le e^{\epsilon} P(A_f(d') \in S) + \delta$$

• We prove the Expected Output Stability Bound. For any DP mechanism with bounded outputs in [0, 1] we have:


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




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
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PixeIDP architecture


- 1. Add a new noise layer to make DNN DP.
- 2. Estimate the DP DNN's mean scores.
- 3. Add estimation error in the stability bounds.

PixeIDP architecture




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PixelDP architecture



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
PixelDP architecture



Resilience to *post-processing*: any computation on the output of an (ε , δ)-DP mechanism is still (ε , δ)-DP.

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
PixeIDP architecture



Compute empirical mean with standard Monte Carlo estimate.


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
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Further challenges

- Train DP DNN with noise.
- Control pre-noise sensitivity during training.
- Support various attack norms (L_1, L_2, L_∞).
- Scale to large DNNs and datasets.


Scaling to Inception on ImageNet

- Large dataset: image resolution is 300x300x3.
- Large model:
 - 48 layers deep.
 - 23 millions parameters.
 - Released pre-trained by Google on ImageNet.




Scaling to Inception on ImageNet

PixeIDP auto-encoder



Scaling to Inception on ImageNet



PixelDP Outline

Motivation

Design

Evaluation

Evaluation:

- 1. Guaranteed accuracy on large DNNs/datasets
- 2. Are robust predictions harder to attack in practice?
- 3. Comparison with other defenses against state-of-theart attacks.

Methodology

Five datasets:

Dataset	Image size	Number of Classes		
ImageNet	299x299x3	1000		
CIFAR-100	32x32x3	100		
CIFAR-10	32x32x3	10		
SVHN	32x32x3	10		
MNIST	28x28x1	10		

Metrics:

- Guaranteed accuracy.
- Accuracy under attack.

Three models:

Dataset	Number of Layers	Number of Parameters		
Inception-v3	48	23M		
Wide ResNet	28	36M		
CNN	3	3M		

Attack methodology:

- State of the art attack [Carlini and Wagner S&P'17].
- Strengthened against our defense by averaging gradients over multiple noise draws.

Guaranteed accuracy on ImageNet with Inception-v3


	Model	Accuracy (%)	Guarant 0.05	teed accu 0.1	uracy (%) 0 . 2
	Baseline	78	-	-	-
More DP noise	PixelDP: L=0.25	68	63	0	0
	PixeIDP: L=0.75	58	53	49	40
				-	

Meaningful guaranteed accuracy for ImageNet!

Accuracy on robust predictions


✤ Baseline

Precision: threshold 0.05




What if we only act on robust predictions? (e.g. if not robust, check ticket)

Accuracy on robust predictions



If we increase the robustness threshold: better accuracy, less predictions.

Comparison with other provable defenses




PixelDP scales to larger models, yielding better accuracy and robustness.

PixelDP summary

- PixeIDP is the first defense that:
 - Gives attack-independent guarantees against normbounded adversarial attacks.
 - And scales to the largest models and datasets.
- Already extensions by others!
 - Improve the bounds at a given noise level (Li+ '18; Cohen+ '19).
 - Use other noise distributions (Pinot+ '19).
 - Adapt optimization (Rakin+ '18).

Appendix

Comparison with best-effort techniques



PixelDP is empirically competitive with the state-of-the-art best-effort defense.

Related work

Best effort


- + Scale:
 - Run a best effort attack per gradient step [Goodfellow+ '15, Madry+ '17].
 - Preprocess inputs [Buckman+ '18, Guo+ '18].
 - Train a second model based on the first one [Papernot+ '16].
- + Flexible:
 - Support most architectures.
- No robustness guarantees:
 - Often broken soon after release [Athalye+ '18].

Certified


- + Provable guarantees:
 - Per prediction [Wong-Kolter+ '18, Wong+ '18, Raghunathan+ '18, Wang+ '18].
 - In expectation [Sinha+ '17].
- Hard to scale:
 - Requires orders of magnitude more computation [Wong-Kolter+ '18, Wong+ '18, Wang+ '18].
 - Support only 1 hidden layer [Raghunathan+ '18].
- Often not flexible:
 - No ReLU, MaxPool, or accuracy guarantees [Sinha+ '17].
 - Only ReLU, no BatchNorm [Wong-Kolter '18].

PixelDP is the first certified defense that both achieves provable guarantees of robustness, scales and is broadly applicable to arbitrary networks.


Results - CIFAR-10




Results - SVHN



Certification on ImageNet/Inception-v3



Certification on CIFAR-10



Comparison with Best Effort Techniques



Undefended: $||\alpha||_{2} = 0.52$

Giant panda





Teddy bear



Teddy bear

- [Goodfellow+ '15] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. ICLR 2015.
- [Papernot+ '16] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami. Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. S&P 2016.
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 Countering adversarial images using input transformations. ICLR 2018.
- [Madry+ '17] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu. *Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks*. arXiv 2017.

- [Carlini-Wagner '17]] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. S&P 2017.
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 Certified defenses against adversarial examples. arXiv 2018.
- [Wang+ '18] S. Wang, K. Pei, W. Justin, J. Yang, and S. Jana. Efficient formal safety analysis of neural networks. NeurIPS 2018.
- [Li+ '18] B. Li, C. Chen, W. Wang, and L. Carin. Second-Order Adversarial Attack and Certifiable Robustness. arXiv 2018.

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