Data-Oriented Programming

On the Expressiveness of Non-Control Data Attacks

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Sendroiu Adrian, Zheng Leong Chua,
Prateek Saxena, Zhenkai Liang

Department of Computer Science
National University of Singapore

Control Attacks are Getting Harder

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



Control Attacks are Getting Harder

- Code injection



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- Code injection ⇐ Data Execution Prevention



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  - return-to-libc
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

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- Code reuse ⟸ Control Flow Integrity
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

A New Attack Class

- Assume: conform to CFI & DEP





A New Attack Class

- Assume: conform to CFI & DEP
- Attackers' capability on arbitrary vul. programs?

Nothing   Specific computation   Turing-complete





Non-Control Data Attacks

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//set root privilege   *
seteuid(0);
......
//set normal user privilege
seteuid(pw->pw_uid);
//execute user's command
```

```
//offset depends on IE version +
safemode = *(DWORD *)
             (jsobj + offset);
if(safemode & 0xB == 0) {
    Turn_on_God_Mode();
}
```

* Shuo Chen, Jun Xu, Emre C. Sezer, Prachi Gauriar, and Ravishankar K. Iyer. Non-Control-Data Attacks Are Realistic Threats. In USENIX 2005.

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- Special cases relying on particular data/functions
  – user id, safemode, private key, etc
  – interpreter – printf() (with “%n”), etc



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- Non-control data attacks can be Turing-complete
- Data-Oriented Programming (DOP)
  - build expressive non-control data attacks
  - independent of any specific data / functions
- DOP builds attacks on real-world programs
  - bypass ASLR w/o address leakage
  - simulate a network bot
  - enable code injection

Motivating Example

```
struct server{int *cur_max, total, typ;} *srv;
int quota = MAXCONN; int *size, *type;
char buf[MAXLEN];
size = &buf[8]; type = &buf[12]
...
while (quota--) {
  readData(sockfd, buf);        // stack bof
  if(*type == NONE ) break;
  if(*type == STREAM)
      *size = *(srv->cur_max);
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      srv->typ = *type;
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Vulnerable Program

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

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


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Vulnerable Program

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


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

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




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

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



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



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



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



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



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



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



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



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



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



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vulnerable program

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



Motivating Example (cont.)

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



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



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



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



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



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



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

Data-Oriented Programming

A Generic Technique

Data-Oriented Programming (DOP)

- General construction
  - w/o dependency on specific data / functions

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  - w/o dependency on specific data / functions
- Expressive attacks
  - towards Turing-complete computation
- Elements
  - data-oriented gadgets
  - gadget dispatchers

Data-Oriented Gadgets

- x86 instruction sequence
  - show in normal execution (CFI)



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

Addition: `srv->total += *size;`

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1     mov (%esi), %ebx     //load micro-op
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


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

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

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

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

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

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

Gadget Dispatcher



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

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

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

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

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

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

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```
while (quota--) {                    // loop
  readData(sockfd, buf);             // selector
  if(*type == NONE ) break;
  if(*type == STREAM) *size = *(srv->cur_max);
   else{ srv->typ = *type;  srv->total += *size; }
}
```

Turing-completeness

- DOP emulates a minimal language *MINDOP*
  - *MINDOP* is Turing-complete

Semantics	Statements In C	Data-Oriented Gadgets in DOP
arithmetic / logical	a op b	*p op *q
assignment	a = b	*p = *q
load	a = *b	*p = **q
store	*a = b	**p = *q
jump	goto L	vpc = &input
conditional jump	if (a) goto L	vpc = &input if *p
p – &a; q – &b; op – any arithmetic / logical operation		

Attack Construction

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while (quota--) {
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  - statically identify load-semantics-store chain from LLVM IR

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- Gadget identification
  - statically identify load-semantics-store chain from LLVM IR
- Dispatcher identification
  - static identify loops with gadgets from LLVM IR
- Gadget stitching
  - select gadgets and dispatchers (manual)
  - check stitchability (manual)

Evaluation

Evaluation – Feasibility

9 x86 programs with 9 vulnerabilities

- Nginx, ProFTPD, Wu-FTPD, sshd, Bitcoind,
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- x86 Dispatchers
  - 1443 in total, 110 reachable from selected CVEs
- 2 programs can build Turing-complete attack
- 3 end-to-end attacks

Case Study: Bypassing Randomization

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  - information leakage to network
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

Case Study: Bypassing Randomization

- Gadgets

MOV	*p = *q
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

Case Study: Bypassing Randomization

- Gadgets

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- Dispatcher

```
while (1) {
    user_request =
        get_user_request();
    dispatch(user_request);
}
```

```
func1() { memory_error; MOV;}
func2() { ADD; }
func3() { LOAD; }
```



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MOV	*X = *0x080dbc28 (**ssl_ctx**)
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

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



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



Case Study: Bypassing Randomization

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


```
write(outsock, buf, strlen(buf));
```



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


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

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


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leak private key to network



dlopen() – Dynamic Linking Interface

- Load the dynamic library into memory space
  - resolve symbols based on binary metadata
  - patch program due to relocation
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

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

- The same to *dlopen*()

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Case Study: Simulating A Network Bot

- Attacks with *dlopen*



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

Case Study: Simulating A Network Bot

- Attacks with *dlopen*
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  - corrupt link list & call *dlopen*



Case Study: Simulating A Network Bot

- Attacks with *dlopen*
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

Case Study: Simulating A Network Bot

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Case Study: Altering Memory Permissions

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  - DEP: non-writable code
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- DOP attacks
  - *dlopen*(code_addr, shellcode)
- Code injection is back!

Related Work

Techniques	Turing Complete?	Preserve CFI?	Independent of specific data / funcs?
Non-control Data Attacks (Chen *et al.* 2005)		✓	
COOP (Schuster *et al.* 2015)	✓		✓
FlowStitch (Hu *et al.* 2015)		✓	
Printf-Oriented Programming (Carlini *et al.* 2015)	✓	✓	
Control Jujustu (Evans *et al.* 2015)		✓	
Data-Oriented Programming	✓	✓	✓

Potential Defenses

- Memory Safety
  - e.g., Cyclone (Jim *et al.* 2002), CCured (Necula *et al.* 2002) , SoftBounds+CETS (Nagarakatte *et al.* 2009, 2010)
  - high performance overhead (> 100%)
- Data-flow Integrity
  - e.g, DFI (Castro *et al.* 2006) , kernel DFI (Song *et al.* 2016)
- Fined-grained randomization in data space
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No practical defenses yet !

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- Data-Oriented Programming (DOP)
  - build expressive non-control data attacks
  - independent of specific data / functions
- In real-world programs, DOP can build attacks
  - bypass ASLR w/o address leakage
  - simulate a network bot
  - enable code injection

Thanks!

Hong Hu

huhong@comp.nus.edu.sg

http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~huhong

Non-control data attacks are available

http://huhong-nus.github.io/advanced-DOP/