I. OVERVIEW

Information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about sensitive information that may be exposed during program execution. One promising approach is to adopt a program as a communication channel model and leverage information theoretic metrics (e.g., mutual information between the sensitive input and the public output) to quantify such information flows. However, recent research has shown discrepancies in such information theoretic metrics: for example, Smith et. al. [5] showed examples wherein using the classical Shannon entropy measure for quantifying information flows may be counter-intuitive. Smith et. al. [5] proposed a vulnerability measure in an attempt to resolve this problem; this measure was subsequently enhanced by Hamadou et. al. [2] into a belief-vulnerability metric (in Oakland 2010). However, we point out that the vulnerability measure may also lead to counter-intuitive results on several other programs. In fact, we show that one can construct infinitely many programs wherein different information leakage measures (proposed in past work) are in conflict. This paper presents the first attempt towards addressing such conflicts and derives solutions for an optimal conflict-free comparison of programs over a class of entropy measures (called Renyi entropy – a well known generalization of the classical Shannon entropy).

II. QUANTIFYING INFORMATION LEAKAGE

Past work on quantitative information leakage metrics has explored using several entropy measures to compute mutual information, including, Shannon entropy, min-entropy, Guessing entropy (see [2, 3, 5] for more details), and so on. However, in most past work, the choice of such entropy measure has been ad hoc (mostly driven by sample programs) – often leading to counter-intuitive results. Consider the following two programs (by Smith [5]), where the secret input $A$ is uniformly distributed $8k$-bit integer with $k \geq 2$, & denotes bitwise and operator and $0^{7k-1}1^{k+1}$ denotes a binary constant.

**PROG P1**

```plaintext
if $A \equiv 0 \mod 8$ then
    $O = A$
else
end if
```

**PROG P2**

```plaintext
O = A \& 0^{7k-1}1^{k+1}
```

Intuitively, one might argue that PROG P1 leaks more information leakage than PROG P2 when $k$ is large, because it reveals complete information about the secret input with probability $\frac{1}{8}$; on the other hand, when $k$ is large, PROG P2 reveals roughly $\frac{1}{8}$ of the number of bits in $A$. However, applying the Shannon entropy measure and computing the mutual information $I_1$ between $A$ and $O$ yields a counter intuitive result:

$$P_1 : I_1(A, O) = -\frac{7}{8} \log \frac{7}{8} - \frac{1}{8} \log \frac{1}{28k} = k + 0.169,$$

$$P_2 : I_1(A, O) = -2^{k+1} \cdot \frac{27k-1}{28k} \log \frac{27k-1}{28k} = k + 1,$$

Indeed, from a security standpoint, PROG P1 leaves $A$ highly vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it is a multiple of 8), while PROG P2 does not (at least for large $k$).

Smith et. al. [5] and Hamadou et. al. [2] proposed a vulnerability measure (a min-entropy measure instead of classical Shannon entropy measure) in an attempt to resolve this problem. However, we point out that the vulnerability measure may lead to counter-intuitive results on several other programs while, the results based on the classical Shannon entropy measure matches our intuition. Consider programs P3 and P4 below.

**PROG P3** Password Checker

```plaintext
if $A = L$ then
    $O = 1$
else
    $O = 0$
end if
```

**PROG P4** Binary Search

```plaintext
if $A \geq L$ then
    $O = 1$
else
    $O = 0$
end if
```
Consider \( L = \|A\|/2 \) is a publicly known program parameter. The intuition is that \( \text{PROG P4} \) leaks much more information than \( \text{PROG P3} \), because when \( k \) is large, the probability of \( A = L \) becomes so low that \( \text{PROG P3} \) leaks almost no information. But \( \text{PROG P4} \) always leaks 1 bit of information, irrespective of \( |A| \).

Now, consider the mutual information based on Shannon entropy \((I_1)\) and the vulnerability metric \((I_v)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
I_v(P_3, 2^k) &= 1, \\
I_v(P_4, 2^k) &\approx 0, \\
I_1(P_3, 2^k) &= 1, \\
I_1(P_4, 2^k) &\approx 1
\end{align*}
\]

Hence, the fundamentally challenge is to device an information leakage metric that is intuitive and conflict-free. Towards this goal, we investigate a class of entropy measures called Renyi-entropy [4] — a well known generalization of various entropy measures including, the classical Shannon entropy, min-entropy and guessing entropy, one-guess vulnerability measure, etc. More precisely, Renyi-entropy defines a family of entropy measures based on a parameter \( \alpha \in (0, \infty) \) such that \( \alpha = 1 \) corresponds to the classical Shannon entropy, \( \alpha = \infty \) corresponds to the min-entropy and \( \alpha = 0 \) corresponds to the vulnerability one-guess entropy.

A. Main Results

We informally state our main results below. For detailed claims and proofs please refer our tech-report [6].

**Conflicts in Metrics:** We show that information flow metrics proposed by past work are inherently prone to *conflicts*, that is, there exists programs \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) and Renyi-entropy parameters \( \alpha, \beta \) \((\alpha \neq \beta)\) such that \( I_{\alpha}(P_1) > I_{\beta}(P_2) \) and \( I_{\beta}(P_1) < I_{\beta}(P_2) \). In addition, we show how to construct infinitely many programs wherein different Renyi-entropy based information leakage measures are in conflict.

**A conflict-free Metric:** For any program \( P \), the asymptote \( \theta^{[1]}(I_{\infty}(P)) \) is a conflict-free.

**Examples:** It is easy to see using the proposed metric \( \theta(I_{\infty}(P)) \) one can resolve the conflicts in information leakage metrics for programs \( P_1 \)-\( P_4 \). In this example, we show the application of our metric to \( \text{PROG P5} \).

**PROG P5 Modulo**

\( O \equiv A \mod L \)

In \( \text{PROG P5} \), one can show that the optimal choice of the low input \( L_i \) (for the \( i^{th} \) program run) is given by:

\[
\{L^*_1, \ldots, L^*_n\} = \operatorname{arg \, max}_{L_1, \ldots, L_i \in \mathcal{L}} \text{lcm}(L_1, \ldots, L_i)
\]

where \( \text{lcm}(L_1, \ldots, L_i) \) refers to the least common multiple \([1] \) of \( L_1, \ldots, L_i \). Using our metric one can show that the information leakage in \( \text{P5} \) for \( n \) runs is given by:

\[
I_{\alpha}(P5, |A|, n) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \log(L^*_i), \forall \alpha \in (0, \infty)
\]

Hence, the information leakage metric for \( \text{PROG P5} \) grows linearly with \( n \), the number of program runs as long as \( \mathcal{L} \) is sufficiently large. However, for finite \( |\mathcal{L}| \) information leakage drops to zero after roughly \( \log_{\frac{|\mathcal{L}|}{\log_{\frac{|\mathcal{L}|}}}} \) program runs, where \( \log_{\frac{|\mathcal{L}|}{\log_{\frac{|\mathcal{L}|}}}} \) denotes the natural logarithm.

For example, when \( \mathcal{L} = \{1, \ldots, 16\} \) then the optimal choice of \( L_i \)'s is given by \( \{16, 15, 13, 11, 7, 3\} \); further choices of \( L \) and subsequent program runs do not offer more information about the high input to the adversary. Figure II-A shows the rate of information leakage with the number of program runs for \( \mathcal{L} = \{1, \ldots, 16\}, \{1, \ldots, 32\} \) and \( \{1, \ldots, 64\} \).

### III. LIMITATION

The results presented in this paper applies only when the number of output symbols and the number of program runs is finite and independent of \( |A| \).

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**REFERENCES**


