Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security

June 2-4, 2005
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138

Original Research Papers on all aspects of the Economics of Information 
Security are solicited for submission to the Fourth Workshop on the 
Economics of Information Security. Topics of interest include liability 
and other legal incentives, game theoretic models, economics of digital 
rights management, security in open source and free software, 
cyber-insurance, disaster recovery, trusted computing, reputation 
economics network effects in security and privacy, security in grid 
computing,  return on security investment, security and privacy in 
pervasive computing, risk management, risk perception, economics of 
trust, virus models, vulnerabilities and incentives, economics of 
malicious code,  identity including PKI, access control, economics of 
electronic voting security, and economic perspectives on spam.

We  invite talks emphasizing economic theory, mathematical modeling, or 
legal theory.  Past notable work used the tools of economics to offer 
insights into computer security; offered mathematical models of 
computer security or economics; detailed potential regulatory solutions 
to computer security; or clarified the challenges of improving security 
as implemented in practice.

Important Dates:
Submissions due -  February 25, 2005
Notification of acceptance - March 11, 2005
Final papers due - April 8, 2005
Workshop June 2-4, 2005

For formats and submission instruction  please visit

Jean Camp

Alessandro Acquisti (CMU)
Ross Anderson (Cambridge)
Huseyin Cavusoglu (Tulane)
Larry Gordon (UMD)
Marty Loeb (UMD)
Andrew Odlyzko (U Minnesota)
Stuart Schechter
Bruce Schneier (Counterpane)
Rahul Telang (CMU)
Hal Varian (UC Berkeley)