Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security June 2-4, 2005 Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 Original Research Papers on all aspects of the Economics of Information Security are solicited for submission to the Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Topics of interest include liability and other legal incentives, game theoretic models, economics of digital rights management, security in open source and free software, cyber-insurance, disaster recovery, trusted computing, reputation economics network effects in security and privacy, security in grid computing, return on security investment, security and privacy in pervasive computing, risk management, risk perception, economics of trust, virus models, vulnerabilities and incentives, economics of malicious code, identity including PKI, access control, economics of electronic voting security, and economic perspectives on spam. We invite talks emphasizing economic theory, mathematical modeling, or legal theory. Past notable work used the tools of economics to offer insights into computer security; offered mathematical models of computer security or economics; detailed potential regulatory solutions to computer security; or clarified the challenges of improving security as implemented in practice. Important Dates: Submissions due - February 25, 2005 Notification of acceptance - March 11, 2005 Final papers due - April 8, 2005 Workshop June 2-4, 2005 For formats and submission instruction please visit http://www.infosecon.net/workshop/index.html Chair: Jean Camp Committee Alessandro Acquisti (CMU) Ross Anderson (Cambridge) Huseyin Cavusoglu (Tulane) Larry Gordon (UMD) Marty Loeb (UMD) Andrew Odlyzko (U Minnesota) Stuart Schechter Bruce Schneier (Counterpane) Rahul Telang (CMU) Hal Varian (UC Berkeley)