THE SIXTH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC-05) Registration now Open! See Accepted Papers, Workshops, Tutorials, below. June 5-8, 2005, Vancouver, Canada http://www.acm.org/ec05 Registration is now open for ACM EC-05! Early registration ends May 16th, so sign up now at: http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/registrations.shtml Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (SIGECOM) has sponsored the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications for electronic commerce. Below is the schedule for the 4 tutorials, 1 workshop, and 32 papers accepted for ACM EC-05. For additional information, please visit: http://www.acm.org/ec05. This year, ACM EC-05 will be held from Sunday, June 5 through Wednesday, June 8, 2005 at the Vancouver Marriott Pinnacle resort, a first-class hotel located downtown in the stunning city of Vancouver, Canada. For more information about the conference surroundings, visit Vancouver's tourism Web site: http://www.tourismvancouver.com Tutorials http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/tutorials.shtml Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Morning 1) Optimal Mechanism Design without Priors - Jason Hartline 2) Trading Agent Design and Analysis - Michael P. Wellman Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Afternoon (two one-hour talks) 1) Polynomial Time Algorithms for Market Equilibria - Kamal Jain and Vijay Vazirani 2) Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges - Tuomas Sandholm Workshop http://research.yahoo.com/~pennockd/ext/ssa/ Sun, Jun 5 2005 - All Day Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions - David Pennock and Kursad Asdemir Final program MONDAY 08:30 - 10:10 Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains Michael Saks, Lan Yu Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan 10:10 - 10:40: BREAK 10:40 - 12:20 Interconnected Communication Networks Provisioned Selfishly Pedro Ferreira, Marvin Sirbu Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks Nicolas Christin, Andreas Weigend, John Chuang A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang 12:20 - 02:00: LUNCH 02:00 - 03:00 Invited Speaker: Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University 03:00 - 03:30: BREAK 03:30 - 05:10 Nearly Optimal Multi Attribute Auctions Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann Optimal Design of English Auctions with Discrete bid Levels Esther David, Alex Rogers, Nicholas Jennings, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David Parkes TUESDAY 08:30 - 10:10 First-Price Path Auctions Nicole Immorlica, David Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions Robert McGrew, Jason Hartline True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs Edith Elkind Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi 10:10 - 10:40: BREAK 10:40 - 12:20 Graceful Service Degradation (or, How to Know your Payment is Late) Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, Chen Zhang Dynamic and Secure B2B E-contract Update Management Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul Grefen Secure Distributed Human Computation Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine 12:20 - 02:00: LUNCH 02:00 - 03:00 Invited Talk: Jennifer Rexford, Princeton University 03:00 - 03:30: BREAK 03:30 - 05:10 Communication Complexity of Common Voting Protocols Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions: Demand Queries and Ascending Auctions Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan Fairness and Optimality in Congestion Games Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay Vazirani Congestion Games with Failures Maria Polukarov, Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz WEDNESDAY 08:30 - 10:10 ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan Self-Selection, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of Negative Feedback at eBay Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David Pennock Integrating Tradeoff Support in Product Search Tools for E-Commerce Sites Pearl Pu, Li Chen 10:10 - 10:40: BREAK 10:40 - 11:55 Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments Ahuva Mu'alem Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General Framework MingYang Kao, XiangYang Li, WeiZhao Wang